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MARCH 14, 1945

Regulation of ARMAMENTS

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

14 March 1945

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will find of
interest the attached memorandum. Will you
kindly see that it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Bill

William J. Donovan
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

14 March 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I am enclosing a study which we have prepared on official discussions of criteria for the regulation of armaments. The study sets forth the chronology and organization of the disarmament negotiations after the last war; an examination of the discussions of population, resources, and arms expenditures as criteria for limitation; and a consideration of Soviet proposals advanced during the conferences.

Donovan
William J. Donovan
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Research and Analysis Branch

R & A No. 2723

REVIEW OF OFFICIAL DISCUSSIONS OF CRITERIA
FOR THE REGULATION OF ARMAMENTS, 1920-1933

Description

The chronology and organization of the disarmament negotiations after the last war; an examination of the discussions of population, resources, and arms expenditures as criteria for limitation; and a consideration of Soviet proposals advanced during the conferences.

Washington

8 February 1945

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SUMMARY

PART ONE

1. Part I, an introduction to the succeeding parts, summarizes the bases of disarmament negotiations in the Covenant of the League of Nations, and the peace treaties that ended World War I. It outlines the organizational framework of the various negotiations held under the League of Nations from 1920 to 1933, describing the structure of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, and the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments. It merely mentions, without discussion, other disarmament activities taking place during these years which are not significant from the point of view of succeeding parts of this report. A bibliography relevant to the several parts of this study is also included.

PART TWO

1. Population as a factor in disarmament was not of major importance during the negotiations from 1920 to 1933, in fact, it was specifically mentioned in only three connections. It was discussed separately in subcommittee meetings with reference to a specific questionnaire as one of the factors entering into a nation's war potential; in the American disarmament plan of 1932, it was proposed that size of home-

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security forces be linked to size of population; and finally, in the Draft Disarmament Convention it is provided that a nation may prolong its term of service for conscript troops beyond convention limits insofar as a decline in the birth rate makes such prolongation necessary to keep army strength up to a prescribed maximum.

2. The question of population had also some bearing on the related problems of methods of recruitment, maintenance of trained reserves, and natural resources as factors in disarmament plans.

PART THREE

1. Although natural resources and "war potential" as factors in disarmament plans were discussed at all stages of the disarmament negotiations, 1919-1933, the main lines of the argument concerning them were laid down before 1927.

2. There was general agreement as to the accepted concept of war potential in its broadest sense; however there was disagreement over the dividing line between armament proper and war potential.

3. There were also two conflicting viewpoints as to how to relate armament limitation to war potential. The French position implied that armaments should be allowed inverse ratio to war potential so as to equalize national ability to wage war; on the other hand, Great Britain

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the United States and Germany wished simply to limit every nation's armament below the level at which it could "commit aggression", ignoring war potential and thus, in effect, according to the French, establishing war strength in direct ratio to natural resources.

PART FOUR

1. The possibility of budgetary limitation of armaments was the subject of thorough investigation and extended discussion among the powers. The question was examined at length in technical sub-commissions of the conference which reported to the conference that it was feasible to report armament expenditures in a standard form and that limitation of expenditures could be used as a method of armament limitation, either alone or in conjunction with direct limitation by specific enumeration.

2. While the technical sub-commissions were able to show the technical feasibility of indirect or budgetary limitation of armaments, considerable opposition was raised against this method of control. This opposition seems to have derived partly from the belief that direct quantitative methods are simpler than indirect financial ones and partly from fear that states with high standards of living or high monetary production costs would suffer from an implicit comparison.

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3. The objections raised by certain powers against budgetary limitation should be evaluated in the light of the fact that these powers raised equally strong objections to other methods of regulation.

PART FIVE

1. In 1927 and 1928, the Government of the USSR presented two draft conventions to the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament. Both Soviet plans differed substantially from the draft convention which formed the basis of the work of the Commission.

2. The first Soviet proposal was for "immediate, complete, and general disarmament" to take place within four years after the acceptance of the convention, with a major part of the disarmament concentrated in the first year.

3. The second Soviet plan called for partial disarmament under a "proportional percentage" plan; it envisaged overall percentage reductions applied to all classes of armament (and effectives) with the largest percentages applied to the most heavily armed nations.

4. Neither of the Soviet plans was adopted by the Commission. Some of the main arguments advanced against them were that they were impractical, that they were outside the framework of the League of Nations, that they would not in

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themselves prevent war, and that they did not take into consideration the security needs of individual nations.

REVIEW OF OFFICIAL DISCUSSIONS OF CRITERIA FOR THE REGULATION
OF ARMAMENTS, 1920-1933

PAR. ONE: CHRONOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION OF THE
DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS

I. INTRODUCTION

The following part of the present reports presents, as a background for the subsequent parts, an outline of the various disarmament negotiations between 1920 and 1933. Later parts review the discussions of the several criteria for arms limitation (population, national resources, arms expenditures) which took place during the negotiations, and of the proposals for disarmament made by the USSR. In the appendices there are presented a bibliography of sources and relevant documentary abstracts.

II. BASES OF THE DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS

The initial stimuli for the disarmament negotiations of 1920-1933 were the peace treaties that ended World War I and the Covenant of the League of Nations.

In accordance with President Wilson's Fourth Point,¹ provisions for disarmament were incorporated into the Covenant in three places:

Article I made acceptance of League regulation of arma-

¹. "Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety."

ment one of the conditions of membership in the League.¹

Article VIII stated the need for disarmament and imposed upon the League Council the responsibility for formulating disarmament plans for member states.¹

Article IX provided for a permanent commission on disarmament.¹

By the terms of the various peace treaties with the Central Powers,² each defeated power "undertakes strictly to observe military, naval, and air clauses" "in order to render possible the initiation of general limitation of the armaments of all nations". Severe disarmament was imposed on the Central Powers: their armies were drastically reduced in size and were to be devoted exclusively to the maintenance of internal order and to the control of the frontiers; the organization of the armies was also prescribed in the Treaties, and the Great German Staff was dissolved. State employees such as forest guards, customs officials, etc., could not be assembled for military training. Manufacture of arms, munitions, or other war material was prohibited except in factories approved by the Allied governments. Importation of arms was prohibited. Manufacture of poisonous gas was prohibited. Universal compulsory military

1. See Appendix A for partial text of Article I and complete texts of Articles VIII and IX.

2. The Treaty of Versailles with Germany, 28 June 1919;
The Treaty of St. Germain with Austria, 10 September 1919;
The Treaty of Neuilly with Bulgaria, 27 November 1919;
The Treaty of Trianon with Hungary, 4 June 1920.

service was abolished. The army could be recruited only by voluntary enlistment for a period of 12 years (25 years for officers). The German air force was liquidated. The German navy was prescribed within very narrow limits, and Germany was forbidden to possess any war ship over 10,000 tons.

The implied promise of general disarmament following disarmament of the defeated nations was contained only in the Preamble to the Treaty clauses on disarmament; therefore it was not, as the Allied powers were repeatedly to point out, a legally binding condition for disarmament of the Central Powers. However, Germany insisted that the moral obligation, at least, was overwhelming; to strengthen her case, she also quoted from Clemenceau's reply to the protests of the German Delegation to the Peace Conference, in which Clemenceau seemingly reaffirmed the Allied intention to disarm subsequent to German disarmament.¹

III. DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, 1920-1933

A. Before 1925

Before 1925, attempts at disarmament were carried out

1. "The Allied and Associated Powers wish to make it clear that the requirements in respect to German armaments were not made solely with the object of rendering it impossible for Germany to resume her policy of military aggression. They are also the first steps towards that general reduction and limitation of armaments which they seek to bring about as one of the most fruitful preventives of war and which it will be one of the first duties of the League of Nations to promote..." Extract from the reply to M. Clemenceau on behalf of the Allied and Associated Powers to the Observations of the German Peace Delegates on The Peace Treaties.

by branches of the League itself. The first four assemblies of the League of Nations (1920, 1921, 1922 and 1923) adopted recommendations calling for limitation of expenditure on armaments. The first and second assemblies called for a two-year budgetary freeze; the third assembly invited all nations to return to their 1913 expenditure; and the fourth assembly recommended that until a general scheme for the reduction of armaments was arrived at, national expenditure should be retained within the limits of the current fiscal year. Results of these recommendations were negligible.

The First Assembly also approved a Temporary Mixed Commission on the Reduction of Armaments to be composed partly of military experts and partly of political, social, and economic experts; this Commission was appointed by the Council in February 1921. The Second Assembly requested the Commission to submit proposals to the Council for the reduction of armaments, preferably in the precise form of a draft treaty or an equally definite plan. Accordingly, Lord Esher presented to the Commission a brief plan for limitation of armament covering only land forces of the European nations. The Commission rejected this proposal, and suggested to the Council, as its reason for doing so, its belief that no scheme for disarmament could be effective which was not general and which did not provide for some form of mutual security as a quid pro quo

for the reduction of national armaments. From this argument arose the decision that disarmament must be linked to security, which was eventually to lead to a cul-de-sac.¹

B. The Preparatory Commission, 1925-1931.

After three years of concentration on security, which resulted in the abortive Geneva Protocol in 1924 and had some effect in bringing about the widely heralded Locarno Agreements, the League of Nations returned to the problem of disarmament. The Sixth Assembly (1925) requested the Council to make a preparatory study with a view towards a conference for the reduction and limitation of armaments. This was the genesis of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, set up by the Council in December 1925. The membership of the Commission was to be made up of representatives of states members of the Council and representatives of countries not on the Council (both members and non-members of the League) which, by reason of their geographical situation occupied a special position regarding the problem of disarmament.²

1. From 1922 onwards, a series of security negotiations paralleled disarmament negotiations. They will not be discussed in this report; however, their successes and failures reacted directly and indirectly upon disarmament negotiations.
2. Membership was later amended to include retiring members of the Council. The full membership came to include the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, the United States, the USSR, Germany, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Finland, the Netherlands, Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Chile, Argentina, Greece, Turkey, Sweden, Spain, Brazil, Uruguay, Venezuela, Persia, China, Irish Free State, Norway and Canada.

The Council made provision for two technical organs to be at the disposal of the Commission: the Permanent Advisory Commission of Military Experts which had been constituted under Article IX of the Covenant; and a Joint Commission to Advise on Economic Questions, consisting of two members each of the economic, financial, and transit organs of the Secretariat, and two members each of the employers and workers groups of the governing body of the ILO. Also, the Council drew up an all-inclusive questionnaire to serve as a frame of reference for the work of the Commission.

The first session of the Preparatory Commission was held in May 1926. The Commission set up two technical sub-commissions and farmed out to them the League Questionnaire. Sub-Commission A was to pass on Military, Naval, and Air Questions, and Sub-Commission B on "other aspects of the problem" (i.e., political, social, and economic questions). Actually, Sub-Commission B simply turned its assignment over to the Joint Commission, which in its turn set up technical committees on special points. (One of these, the Committee of Experts on Budgetary Questions, continued to work directly for the Preparatory Commission and, later, the Disarmament Conference).

The second session of the Preparatory Commission, in September 1926, was purely for form's sake, since the Sub-

Commissions had not yet reported. Sub-Commission A finally turned in a 176-page report in November 1926; Sub-Commission B submitted a group of three reports in March 1927.

The Third Session of the Preparatory Commission, in March and April 1927 drew up a Draft Convention on Disarmament based on the reports of the Sub-Commissions and on a synoptic table drawn from proposed British and French draft treaties. The first reading revealed many areas of non-agreement, and the Commission adjourned sine die, in order to give the individual governments a chance to iron out differences through direct negotiation.

The Fourth Session of the Preparatory Commission, in November 1927, and the Fifth Session, in March 1928, did not achieve a second reading of the Draft Convention. They were mainly concerned with two Soviet proposals, one for the complete abolition of armaments, and the other for proportional reduction of armaments.¹

The Sixth Session finally convened in April 1929 and advanced to the second reading of the Draft Convention; however, the text agreed upon in this reading was so unsatisfactory to many of the states that in the Tenth Assembly of the League (September 1929) many of the so-called "agreed" points were

1. See Part Five for a discussion of the Soviet proposals.

reopened. The Sixth Session had never formally adjourned; the members finally reassembled in November 1930 for the third and last reading of the Draft Convention. With this, the Commission considered its work completed; it avoided setting a date for the Disarmament Conference, leaving this job to the Council.

C. The Disarmament Conference, 1932-1933

In February 1932 the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments finally convened at Geneva. The Conference soon presented a "study in devolution"; it organized itself into:

The Bureau of the Conference -- for deciding on the order of business

The General Commission -- for conducting the general business of the conference; it was empowered to constitute commissions and sub-commissions and did so, as follows:

Land Commission

Naval Commission

Air Commission

National Defense Expenditure Commission

Political Commission

Moral Disarmament Commission

Special Committee to Cover Chemical and Bacterial
Weapons

Special Committee on Effectives

Special Committee on the Trade and Manufacture
of Armaments

(Practically speaking, these sub-commissions simply duplicated technical and semi-technical work which had previously been studied in the Preparatory Commission and its subordinate bodies.)

At the first session, the Disarmament Conference became involved in studying a proposal for "qualitative" disarmament-- that is, for the abolition or limitation of aggressive as opposed to defensive weapons. Also, it held discussions on a plan for disarmament presented by President Hoover, which provided for the abolition of certain specified aggressive weapons and for the reduction of all other armaments (over a certain "defense" contingent) by one-third. However, no action was taken on either of these proposals. After the first session, the Conference developed into a duel between Germany and France over equality of rights for the former: few proposals concerning disarmament were made at the second session (December 1932-June 1933) the main ones being "French

plan" (which was mainly a security proposal) and a British Draft Treaty for direct limitation of armaments (with figures filled in for the size of standing armies). Both these proposals were still-born.

The Disarmament Conference actually achieved no concrete results; it became more and more sterile during its first two years and, after the withdrawal of Germany in October 1933, its existence became purely nominal.

D. Other Negotiations under Article VIII of the Covenant

Certain other draft conventions were drawn up under the terms of reference of Article VIII of the League Covenant, dealing with trade in armaments and with chemical warfare; these Conventions had little or no bearing on the disarmament negotiations under discussion in the succeeding parts in this series and are consequently not detailed here.

IV. DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS UNCONNECTED WITH THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Between 1920 and 1933 certain other disarmament conferences were held beyond the framework of the League of Nations. However, the particular aspects of disarmament which are under discussion in the following parts of this series did not enter into these conferences; the most important ones are listed here merely for the record:

The Washington Conference, 1921-1922. This resulted in the Treaty of Washington between France, Great Britain, the United States, Italy and Japan, limiting certain naval armament on a tonnage basis.

The Moscow Conference, 1922. The purpose of this conference was to effect proportional reduction of the armies of the USSR and its Baltic neighbors; however, the Soviet proposal was not accepted.

The London Naval Conference, 1930. This resulted in the Treaty of London, imposing further naval limitation on a tonnage basis upon Japan, the United States, and Great Britain.

PART TWO: POPULATION AS A FACTOR IN DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS

I. DISCUSSION OF POPULATION DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS

The idea that population is a specific factor which should be weighed in making disarmament plans was never carefully canvassed by the powers at the various disarmament negotiations between 1920 and 1933. In fact, the subject made only three entrances into the long discussions.¹

The first of these was in Question V (a) of a General Questionnaire submitted in 1925 to the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference -- should population (together with such other factors as resources, geographical situation, communications, etc.) be taken into account in drawing up the scale of armaments permissible to the various countries? The Questionnaire was referred by the Commission to two sub-commissions, each representing all the member nations. The sub-commissions devoted little attention to Question V (a); in their final reports to the Preparatory Commission, they merely generalized, as might have been expected, that the size, density, and arrangement of population were factors which affected war potential but could not be accurately measured. (Incidentally, final reports of the two sub-committees totalled over 200 pages, only five of which were taken up by the answers to this point).

1. These instances are summarized here and discussed in detail

In the Draft Convention on Disarmament, which the Preparatory Commission finally produced to submit to the Disarmament Conference proper, the only mention of population is connected with the length of military service; at the suggestion of the Belgian delegate, Article 8 of the Convention provided that a nation was to be allowed to prolong its term of service for conscripts beyond the convention limits insofar as a decline in the birth rate had made such prolongation necessary to keep army strength up to the maximum allowed in the treaty. All the states represented acquiesced in Article 8.

Later, during the Conference itself, an American proposed disarmament plan included the suggestion that population be used as a measure of the size of army necessary for internal security in each state, taking as a standard the size allowed the Central Powers under the peace treaties and making special allowances for overseas possessions. Additional army strength was also to be allowed for defense; this would not be linked to population. Discussion of the American proposal as a whole became so completely entangled in the French insistence on security before disarmament, the German fight for equality of rights, and Litvinov's periodic injection of the Soviet proposals¹ that the discussion seldom managed to focus about

1. See Part Five for a description of Soviet disarmament plans.

a specific point. However, the following attitudes towards the proposition were suggested:

Germany, Austria, and Hungary were naturally in favor of it, since it tended to bring the other nations in line with their disarmed state.

The British Empire reserved judgment; although lukewarm to the US proposal as a whole, it would probably have had no objections to the relation of security forces to population, since it was claimed that British forces, taking into account colonial needs, were already smaller than the suggested limit.

The USSR changed from initial agreement to opposition, both because the US proposal recognized the condition of imperialism (in its allowance for extra colonial troops) and because the division of forces into two contingents, only one of which was linked to population, allowed taking into consideration "individual instances" to such an extent that nothing could be accomplished.

France and the smaller nations under her influence pinpricked the proposal from every angle, although claiming to agree with it in principle; they objected that the method did not take into account "secret" army strength, that it gave unfair advantage to large nations, leaving small ones defenseless, and that it ignored the possibilities of nations leaguings toget-

her. In other words, their view was that security must be arranged before any disarmament plan would be acceptable.

II. DISCUSSIONS OF RELATED PROBLEMS

Although these are the only specific mentions of the population factor, the attitudes of the states to certain related problems have some bearing on the question. Of these problems, the most frequently recurring were those concerning methods of recruitment, maintenance of trained reserves, and natural resources as a factor in disarmament plans.

The interesting fact about the issue of voluntary recruitment versus conscription was that states did not divide along population lines but according to traditional methods. France strongly favored conscription as the only possible method, coupled with short terms of service (except for French colonial troops); she based her stand both on the grounds of equality and on the argument that conscription was the only method whereby a state with a small population could maintain a strong army. On the other hand, well-populated states such as Russia also favored conscription (and Germany favored it if she were to be allowed to have it), whereas states ranging in population from the United States to the Balkan countries favored standing armies. This difference did not become a bone of contention; the problem was solved rather early by agreement

to regulate merely the number and term of service of effectives and not their method of recruitment. Decision on what constituted an effective, however, brought up the whole thorny question of what to do with trained reserves. Upon this point France was and remained intransigent: the number of trained reserves should not be limited in any fashion. France insisted that her relatively small total strength necessitated training for all. The British Empire and the United States, which originally favored exact limitation on the number of trained reserves, agreed to a compromise solution that substantially gave way to the French view. Germany, during the meetings of the Preparatory Commission, also favored limitation of trained reserves, simply because the Versailles Treaty had enforced so long a period of service for regular army members that it would have been impossible to create in addition any pool of trained reserves.

Another question -- what constituted war potential and what was its importance in disarmament -- caused significant cleavages.¹ As far back as the meetings of the sub-commissions to the Preparatory Commission, France² wanted to include every

1. See Part Five for more detailed discussion of this point.

2. Also Argentina, Belgium, Rumania, Italy, Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Japan.

possible element of war potential within the scope of the conference, so that quantitative limitations of armaments could be based on strength in posse as well as in esse. Germany, the United States, and the British Empire,¹ on the contrary, wanted armaments narrowly defined and limitations based strictly on armaments -- not war potential. They were inclined, however, to consider stock-piles and trained reserves as armaments, and hence limitable; of these they had practically none. Although it was early decided to restrict narrowly the definition of armaments (and even more narrowly the scope of limitation), this general line of division persisted throughout the various conferences; the French from time to time attempted to reintroduce "war potential"; the United States and the British Empire consistently frowned on such attempts. However, part of their unwillingness to reopen the discussion stemmed, not from principle, but from tactics: the French, in general, had adopted the delaying strategy of constantly broadening the frame of reference, linking each point with all other points, and insisting upon the "interrelationship" of everything -- especially of everything and security.

III. THE BASIS OF OPINIONS

This suggests a concluding reservation: any opinion expressed by any state upon any specific point (such as the

1. Also Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Bulgaria.

influence of population) during the various disarmament conferences must be interpreted at second or third, to say the least. Even by going back of the Assembly discussions to the Conference, back of the Conference to the Preparatory Commission, and back of both of these to the so-called technical subdivisions, one finds no purely technical decisions. In other words, since the technical discussions were always political, and since the political positions of the various nations were not only related to that particular decade but even fluctuated within it, opinions on technical points were often adopted, certainly not from impartial discussion nor even from considerations of military expediency, but from motives in the broadest sense political or, in the narrowest sense, tactical. As such, they represent not fixed but constantly variable opinions, varying with immediate political attitudes.

PART THREE: RESOURCES AS A FACTOR IN DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS

I. INTRODUCTION

Disarmament negotiations between the two wars may be divided into three stages. (This division ignores the separate naval disarmament conferences; in them, discussion of war potential had little significance, except very indirectly as it concerned maritime communications). In tracing the idea of the war potential through these stages, the first period is by far the most significant since it was then that the lines of the argument were laid down. The present report therefore covers this period only. The two later periods were devoted largely to extended discussion along the same lines of argument.

The first stage dates from the Versailles Treaty to 1927 (the third session of the Preparatory Commission for Disarmament). During this time, in a variety of memoranda, commissions, and especially sub-commissions, the groundwork was laid. Although the discussion was supposed to be preparatory and technical in nature, actually the positions expressed by the various countries continued to be held, substantially unmodified, throughout all further negotiations.

During the second period, from 1926 to 1931, the Preparatory Commission for Disarmament was trying to hammer out a draft convention. Few new ideas were presented at this time,

except for the Soviet proposal for immediate and complete, or failing this, proportional disarmament; the negotiations are interesting mainly as a study of the extent to which the states are willing to compromise.

The third stage, 1931 to 1933, is that of the Disarmament Conference itself. Theoretically, this should have been the time for reaching agreement on method; actually, the Conference became little more than an occasion for distintegration in which even the spade-work of the preceding decade was ignored.

Disarmament negotiations were substantially broken off by the withdrawal of the German delegation from the Conference, in 1933.

II. THE DISCUSSIONS OF 1920-1927

During these seven years, war potential was discussed from two points of view -- what it was, and what should be done about it -- i.e., how it could be linked with arms limitation.

On the point of definition there was general agreement when the expression was used in its broadest sense as including armaments. Besides the actual military forces and fixed-defense systems of a nation, the accepted concept of war potential took into account population (with emphasis on size, density, and homogeneity); degree of self-sufficiency (or, as an alternative, control of communication lines); geographical

situation (especially the length and strength of its frontiers); capacity to produce or import war material; financial strength; stocks of material; railway systems; political system; stability; etc.¹ On the other hand, when the attempt was made to differentiate between armaments and war potential, the question of where to draw the line was never settled, since each nation wished to classify as "armaments" only what it was willing to limit. Thus, for the French "trained reserves" and "materials in stock" were not armaments, but the Panama Canal was; whereas of course for the United States exactly the reverse was true.

Assuming that war potential and armaments could be distinguished, two distinct and conflicting views emerged as to whether to limit a nation's armaments according to its war potential. The French position amounted to a claim that peacetime armament limits should be set in inverse ratio to a nation's other war potential: thus a nation weak in ultimate strength should conversely be strong in preparedness, and could so guarantee its security.² This position was also held by nations in the French entourage -- Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Poland, Yugoslavia; it was also held by other nations which considered themselves vulnerable or "have-not's" -- Belgium,

1. See Appendix F.

2. See Appendix F.

Argentina, Italy, Japan (Japan, however, expressed few opinions on anything except naval disarmament), and, a rather interesting adherent, Hungary.¹

On the other hand, Great Britain, the United States, and Germany, reinforced by certain smaller nations -- Sweden, Spain, Bulgaria, Finland, and the Netherlands, were most unwilling to broaden the frame of reference in this manner. Their position, roughly, was that armaments should be limited to such an extent that no nation could successfully commit aggression. If there could be no aggression, there would be no war, and the question of ultimate war strength would be immaterial. There were perhaps three reasons for this conflict of views. In the first place, as nations with strong war potentials, the first three countries would have had the lowest armament limits under the French plan. In the second place, there was the feeling that the whole French proposal was merely a scheme directed at Germany, to keep her disarmed while allowing other nations -- and particularly France -- to retain their relatively high levels of armaments.² In the third place, the technical problem

1. See Appendix G.

2. "Their [The French] object was to do as little disarmament as possible themselves...while at the same time keeping Germany... in a state of disarmament corresponding...to the terms of the Peace Treaty...Look again at the question about a ratio of armaments for each State...One could not help thinking, as the scheme was expounded, that somehow or other x for France would come out at somewhere near her present armaments and for Germany the armaments of the Peace Treaty." (Temperley, Maj. Gen, A.C. The Whispering Gallery of Europe. Gen. Temperley was a member of the ~~British~~ British delegation to the Preparatory Commission, where he sat in Sub-Commission A, and to the Disarmament Conference).

of evaluating war potential in comparative quantitative terms was staggering; and once the door was opened to non-quantitative measures, anything could be suggested as a factor in war potential.¹

It will be understood that the opposing viewpoints were not presented on the straight forward lines suggested in the preceding paragraphs; instead, they unfolded gradually during discussions concerning, mainly, the definition of armaments, especially of peacetime armaments, the standards to be used in measuring the armaments of one country against the armaments of another, the question "whether ultimate war strength could be limited or whether measures of disarmament must be confined to peace strength", and the scope of the phrase "reduction and limitation of armaments". These points of reference had all been suggested by the Questionnaire which was presented to the Preparatory Commission by the League Council as a frame of reference for the former's work. In the long run, discussion on war potential was to focus on the problem of limiting trained reserves.

In defining the general expression "armaments", the US, the British Empire, and Germany made a three-fold division: permanently organized military forces plus their material and

1. See Appendix H.

establishments; reserves of material and of men; and "ultimate war forces created during hostilities by means of the general resources at the disposal of each country." Then they made the careful distinction that these general resources themselves were not armaments strictly speaking.

On the other hand, the French school held that there was peacetime armaments and wartime armaments. The former corresponded to permanently organized military forces; the latter included trained reserves and stocks, material which could be requisitioned, and "all other personnel and material that can be brought into action" -- i.e., a nation's resources.¹

From this, it followed that in defining peacetime armaments, France excluded trained reserves and stock-piles, whereas the British Empire, and Germany included them. On the other hand, France wished to include "any adaptation of the geographical features of the country with a view to war" and "any adaptation of the industry of a country with a view to war capable of being used without measures of mobilization." The US objected to both of these inclusions, and the British Empire to the latter.²

Finally, carrying this definition through to a logical conclusion, since the Preparatory Commission as a whole had

1. See Appendix I.

2. See Appendix J.

decided that only peacetime strength could be limited,¹ France had adopted the position of wishing to exclude from regulation her trained reserves and stocks of material. On the other hand, in discussing standards to be used in measuring the armaments of one country against the armaments of another, France continually claimed that, since resources were inextricably connected with armaments, they should be taken into consideration in any attempt to set up such guides; the other group of nations did not oppose this stand in principle, but contented themselves by pointing out over and over again the impossibility of reducing resources to a formula.²

Sub-commission A, in which the major discussions took place, held in all 51 meetings over a period of 10 months without coming to agreement on these questions. Finally, it embodied both points of view in its final report (written for this reason mostly in parallel columns) which it submitted to the Preparatory Commission itself in March 1927.³ The lack of agreement represented by this Report was to remain characteristic of the Disarmament negotiations.

1. See Appendix K.

2. See Appendix L

3. Most countries which sent a delegation to the Preparatory Commission was represented on Sub-commission A: Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, British Empire, Bulgaria, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Yugoslavia, Netherlands, Poland, Rumania, Spain, Sweden, United States, Uruguay. The USSR was not a member; although she eventually joined the Preparatory Commission, she did not do so until 1927, after the Sub-commission had finished its session.

PART FOUR: LIMITATION OF EXPENDITURE AS A FACTOR
IN DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS

I. INTRODUCTION

Limitation¹ of armament expenditure was one of the methods of effecting disarmament most thoroughly canvassed during the disarmament negotiations after World War I. At almost every session, the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament² argued the case of budgetary versus direct limitation. At the same time, it authorized a series of technical sub-committees to study the practicability of budgetary limitation and the implementation of such a method.

At the Disarmament Conference itself, less discussion took place concerning limitation of expenditure. There the delegates devoted most of their time to political problems. However, the Conference set up in its turn a Sub-commission on National Defense Expenditure; the sub-commission after reviewing the budgets of 19 states (out of 27 submitted to it), prepared a three-volume report echoing the optimistic conclusions of earlier technical groups about the feasibility of budgetary limitation.

1. The term "limitation" will be used throughout to cover limitation and/or reduction of armaments: from the standpoint of this study, the problems arising from either purpose are the same.

2. See Part One for the chronology and organization of the various disarmament conferences.

The consideration of limitation of armament expenditure throughout these various conferences might be chronologically summarized as follows:

I. The so-called "technical" reports prepared by sub-commissions of the Preparatory Commission in 1926 and 1927 (before the third session of the Preparatory Commission).

II. Discussions during the third and sixth session of the Preparatory Commission, 1927-1930 and the fragmentary discussion at the Disarmament Conference itself in 1932.

III. Technical reports submitted to the Disarmament Conference by the Committee of Experts on Budgetary Question (in 1931) and by the National Defense Expenditure Committee (in 1932).

II. THE TECHNICAL REPORTS OF THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION, 1926-1927

Before the Preparatory Commission to the Disarmament Conference began its actual work (at its third session), it had farmed out to its two technical sub-committees a questionnaire drawn up by the Council of the League of Nations to form the frame of reference of the Commission's activities. Within the questionnaire, expenditure on armaments had to be discussed in the light of two questions: first, was expenditure on armaments an adequate standard by which to measure the armaments of one country against those of another; and,

second, could limitation of expenditure be used as a method of armament limitation? Both these questions were taken up by both Sub-commissions, Sub-commission A on Military, Naval, and Air Problems, and Sub-commission B on Political and Economic Problems.

A. Report of Sub-commission A.

In its final report to the Preparatory Commission, the members of Sub-commission A reported unanimously that expenditure was not an adequate standard of comparison for armaments. On the other hand, there was a difference of opinion as to the efficacy of limiting armaments by limiting expenditure. France, Italy, Poland, Spain, Finland, Belgium, and the Balkan nations believed that this method was promising (although they did not wish to exclude the consideration of other methods); however, the United States, the British Empire, Germany, Japan, Sweden, and the Netherlands held that reduction of expenditure on armament was only an indirect approach to a result which could be better attained directly. The declarations of these two groups of states in support of their respective positions are significant, since they were constantly cited during the succeeding negotiations.

The French began their analysis of the first point (expenditure as a standard of comparison) with a careful

breakdown of armament budgets: they cover (1) expenditure on personnel and (2) expenditure on material. Expenditure on personnel may be further subdivided into (a) expenditure on pay and (b) expenditure on maintenance. Neither of these is comparable between different countries, the former because of the differences imposed by the systems of conscription and voluntary enlistment, the latter because of differences in the number of paid and unpaid services, different standards of living, different accounting methods, etc. Expenditure on material may be divided into (a) expenditure on upkeep and (b) expenditure on purchase (or manufacture) of new material. Of these, the latter is more important. But it is not a useful yardstick, since for this purpose expenditure must be reduced to cost-price (a difficult procedure) and since even at that level differences in real productivity intervene in the calculations. Thus the conclusion is reached that "expenditure is not a direct criterion of comparison between the armaments of the different countries."

The next question raised is: In any one country, can the present level of expenditure as compared to the prewar level of expenditure be used as a guide? But this must be done either by (1) expressing expenditure in gold value or by (2) utilizing or constructing some sort of armament index

numbers. Either method is open to question, especially in times of fluctuating values. The first is inaccurate because in countries with a depreciated currency the internal and external purchasing power of money is quite different. As for the second, the composition of any standard index (such as the wholesale price index) differs from country to country; and any specially-constructed composite would be overly complicated.

Furthermore, different methods of framing the military budget introduce additional complications:

It may be calculated on a gross or on a net basis.

Military and naval establishments may or may not appear in the budgets of war and naval ministries.

Stocks may or may not be treated as deferred charges.

Civil budgets are sometimes the ones to provide for quartering, subsidies to aeronautics, grants to factories for the manufacture of armaments, etc.

Pensions may or may not be included in the military budget.

Colonial defense may be charged to the home or to the colonial budget.

Sometimes no distinction is made between upkeep and new expenditure, whereas "this is of fundamental importance."

Sometimes working capital for manufacturing establish-

ments is not covered in the military budget.

Also, a budget is only an estimate; what is needed is the actual expenditure.

And, a final difficulty, publicity of budget varies between different countries.

After this list of reservations, the French declaration concludes that the percentage of military expenditure to total expenditure, although not a standard of comparison, is a factor to be taken into account in estimating the military effort of the different countries; but "it must be understood that the percentage...cannot form part of the machinery for the reduction of armaments."

This declaration should be related to the general French position on disarmament, i.e., all possible factors must be taken into consideration in assessing a nation's military strength; but no single simple standard of comparison may be adopted because of differences in security.

When they came to determining methods of armament limitation, the French and supporting delegations offered a plan to limit the military budget, not as a percentage of total budget but as a set figure determined separately (presumably at the Disarmament Conference) for every nation. To be effective, such a method would have to meet certain specifications:

It would have to cover all the expenditure on national defense, no matter how included in the budget;

It would have to apply both to the total expenditure on national defense and to each of the main divisions of this expenditure;

It would have to be based on gross expenditure; and

It must be applied in practice not only to the budget estimates but also to the expenditure actually incurred.

With these provisions, the method would have certain marked advantages:

It would be "tangible and easily understood";

It would help to alleviate the financial situation of States;

It might compensate for imperfections in any direct method of limitation (for instance, it could encompass subsidy payments);

It would provide a means of gauging the rate of purchase of new material; and

It could be checked by public documents, thus posing no control problem.

The method suggested ran somewhat as follows: the national armament budget could be divided into two parts, (1) items for which a direct quantitative limitation was set

by the Disarmament Conference and (2) other items. The figures for part (1) would be calculated on the basis of these direct limitations; for the rest, figures would be determined on the basis of arguments advanced by the individual states. The maximum budget for each country would be calculated on the basis of present expenditure and would involve decreases in that expenditure proportionate to the reduction of armaments agreed to by the State concerned. "Provision may be made for possible increases to meet specific exceptional circumstances...e.g., the necessity of completing or reconstituting exhausted stocks, replacing obsolete, worn-out, or unsuitable material, manufacturing or constructing essential material, or, in the case of countries with industries still undeveloped, making the necessary purchases or adjusting pay, salaries and wages to the cost of living."

Limitation would apply to expenditure both on personnel and material. If the military budget included expenditure on other heads than armaments, such expenditures would be excluded from limitation. The maximum budget would show separate total expenditure and expenditure by categories; also, it would separate new construction and purchase, which should be limited for the overall duration of the Convention and also apportioned annually, with some provisions for flexibility.

The maximum budget could be modified only after justification to some sort of permanent disarmament council. However, the budget would be expressed in national currency and could be modified automatically every year in accordance with variations in the cost of living. Execution would be secured by annual production of uniform extracts from budget accounts.

The French proposal opens the door to numerous complications and variations, both because of its insistence that the figure of each state must be determined separately (after full consideration of all relevant factors) and because of its multiplicity of required categories, for which separate limits must be set.

In contrast to the detailed French study, the delegations led by the United States presented their position in a few paragraphs:

They concurred in the Sub-commission's unanimous text that "expenditure on national defense does not appear in present circumstances to constitute a standard of comparison for armaments."

Furthermore, they were of the opinion that "the percentage of its total budget expenditure which a given country devotes to its national defense could not be regarded as a factor for estimating the military effort made by that country

without inducing comparison, which would be misleading and unfair...The total budgets are framed on principles which are peculiar to the respective States, and military expenditure must be estimated with reference to the requirements of national security and not to the financial situation of the country as shown by budgets."

Advancing to the consideration of limitation proper, the delegations further developed this viewpoint:

Direct and indirect costs of personnel under different systems of recruitment are too variable for comparison;

Differences in rates of pay, production costs, maintenance charges, costs of labor and material, varying standards of living, variations in exchange rates, and lack of uniformity in preparation of budgets would cause inequity;

Direct limitation is technically possible and more desirable; and

While comparison without limitation is possible, limitation without comparison is not; this alone will rule out limitation by means of expenditure.

Consequently, "in view of the fact that the expenditure attaching to the establishment and upkeep of armaments constitutes neither a real measure of such armaments nor an equitable basis for the limitation of armaments, the...delega-

tions are convinced that a limitation of budgetary expenditure would not constitute in itself a practicable or equitable method for the limitation of armaments."

This strong distaste for budgetary limitation seems to be derived partly from a feeling that "direct" quantitative methods are simpler than "indirect" financial ones and partly from fear that states with high standards of living or high monetary production costs would suffer from an implicit comparison. In fact, the delegates were concerned with expressing disapproval of the French plan, not with assessing budgetary limitation in the abstract.

B. Report of Sub-commission B

Sub-commission B was to consider the political and economic implications of the League questionnaire. Actually, it functioned as a referral agency. The double problem of expenditure as a standard of comparison and as a possible means of limitation was handed over to a Joint Commission to Advise on Economic Questions which had been set up for the use of the Preparatory Commission by the League. The Joint Commission not only submitted an outline of its own, but suggested the need for further study by budgetary experts. A Commission of Experts on Budgetary Questions was accordingly formed; it submitted its first report in March 1927.

The report of the Joint Commission to Sub-commission B¹ is loosely organized to answer the three questions: What is meant by the term "defense expenditure"? What is the relation between budget expenditure and the size of armed forces -- that is to say, can the former be used as a standard of comparison for the latter? Finally, is the limitation of defense expenditure a feasible method of armament limitation?

In trying to arrive at a definition, the Joint Commission points out that at present differences in national budgets make "defense expenditure" an indefinite sort of term. Does it include:

Pensions,

Private military or physical culture organizations,

Lighthouses, hydrographic offices, and coast guard stations,

Work of a civil character performed by military and naval establishments,

Police forces,

Expenditure for roads, railways, mercantile marine, aircraft and fuelling facilities dictated by military requirements but often not included in military budgets,

Subsidies to private industries capable of producing

1. Submitted to the Preparatory Commission as Report No. 1 of Sub-commission B.

war materials?

Also, what is to be done about differences in accounting methods?

Shall the basis be gross appropriations or net (net appropriations are defined as expenditure after deduction of various receipts, such as proceeds of sale of disused material, repayments by other government departments, contributions from local authorities, and "sometimes even the yield of special taxes"?

What is to be done when state arsenals are not covered in the defense budgets?

What about extraordinary construction appropriations which are covered by loan budgets?

What about defense expenditure distributed among local authorities rather than assumed by the federal government?

How are stock piles to be assessed?

Obviously, the Joint Commission was wrestling with the same problems as Sub-commission A. It came, however, to somewhat more optimistic conclusions: although there is no direct comparability between states under present budgetary regimes, and although there is no immediate possibility of persuading states to adopt a standard budgetary form, still, a uniform standard model could be extracted without too much difficulty from the individual national budgets. Such a statement could

cover the following headings:

| | | |
|------------------------|---|--------------------------------|
| Army expenditure |) | under each of which should be |
| Navy expenditure |) | itemized personnel, material, |
| Air force expenditure) | | fortifications and other fixed |
| | | property, and training |

Other direct charges, such as
Police guards
Frontier and other fiscal guards
Voluntary and auxiliary forces.

Although a standard model could be drawn up, the results should not be used as a standard of comparison between nations. The difficulties canvassed by the French declarations to Sub-commission A are reviewed as obstacles to direct comparison.

The next question is: Could the percentage relation of defense expenditure to total budget expenditure be used as a standard? Besides the non-comparability of what is included as defense expenditure, there is the larger question of non-comparability of total budgets. Total budget expenditure in some countries includes such features as working expenses of railways, postal services and other public undertakings; extraordinary outlay on construction (capital investment); social charges in connection with old-age pensions, invalidity funds, and the like; and a share of State taxes due to provinces and municipalities. In certain countries, debt service represents 50 percent of total budget charges, while in others it is insignificant. The varying allocation of funds between central

the national budget, especially in a federal state.¹ After weighing these difficulties, the Commission rejected percentage of total expenditure as a standard.

In evaluating limitation of defense expenditure as a means of armament limitation, the Commission hedged. Because of the "possibilities of camouflage", the members were not satisfied with budget limitation alone. However, if the contracting parties should agree upon specific maximum figures for effectives and material, budgetary limitation would be a useful supplement. If such budgetary limitation were adopted, expenditure on certain main categories of armament should be limited as well as total expenditure; the overall expenditure would prevent expansion in the quantitatively unlimited fields,

1. In an attempt to "find a basis for the allocation of expenditure between the states Members of the League," an analysis was made of state expenditure "separating all 'abnormal' items, which either did not obtain in all States or the magnitude of which varied considerably, from total expenditure. The remaining 'normal' items were thought to give an indication of the economic strength of the various States, but it was found that a great number of qualifications had to be made. The total 'normal' items for Australia, for example, were higher than those for Canada, although the national income of Canada is about one-third as large again as that of Australia. This was partly due to the fact that in Australia the expenditure of the several States, which had been included in the normal items, covers functions which in other countries are performed by provincial and municipal bodies. But even if the Australian figures were substantially reduced on that account, it would still be necessary to take into account the differences between the political systems of the two countries. These countries would appear to constitute a striking example of general limitation of the accuracy within which economic strength can be measured." (League of Nations, Preparatory Commission for the

and the ~~essential~~ categories might be those in which quantitative limitation was somewhat difficult. Another suggestion made was that selected items of expenditure might be good check points on the extent of armament activity, but the items would have to be most carefully picked. Still another method of checking might be to take the national expenditure for a key year after a quantitative limitation convention was in force and to consider changes in the figure afterwards as indicative of performance or non-performance of the Treaty terms.

To summarize, the Joint Commission was more convinced than was Sub-commission A that budgetary expenditure on armament could be determined and could be organized in a standard usable form. But the term "usable" represents something of an overstatement, for this Commission also, believing that separate evaluation was necessary to do justice to the security needs of every nation, failed to see in budgetary limitation alone a satisfactory solution to such a complex problem.

When the Joint Commission advanced the suggestion of a standard model, it also suggested that "it would be of great assistance to secure the collaboration of.../Budgetary/experts... before the model statement is drawn up in its final standard form." It was along these lines that the Committee of Experts on Budgetary Questions advanced to prepare the report finally submitted to Sub-commission B.¹

The members swiftly concluded that no synthetic definition of budgetary expenditure could be reached; however, when

1. Submitted to the Preparatory Commission as Report No. III of Sub-commission B.

they began to compile a list of items which should be included, they ran across no great differences of opinion. On three such items they made special reservations: police forces were included only insofar as the Military, Naval, and Air experts should decide that they were a part of armament; pensions were excluded pending decision of the Commission to the contrary; and colonial forces were shown separately so that they could be easily abstracted in case special treatment were decided on for them.

The members followed certain principles in drawing up their Trial Model Statement:

It must cover all expenditures relating to national defense, irrespective of budget classification.

It must show separate lists of items of expenditure for land, naval, and air armaments.

It must show separate expenditure on home forces, colonial forces, and police forces.

It could not show any such separation for naval armaments.

In its preliminary form, the statement consisted of three summary tables -- on land, sea, and air forces -- with more detailed sub-tables for each heading or sub-heading of the master tables. Headings common to the three master tables were:

Maintenance of effectives -- this included expenditure on pay, rations, clothing, medical expenses, etc.; also expenditure necessary for building up reserves of stores required to meet these same needs at the time of mobilization. There were provisions for indicating the number of effectives and provisions for personnel not normally forming part of military formations.

Transport

Barracks, Works, Buildings and Fixtures -- within which there was a special sub-head for fortifications and defense works.

Warlike stores -- "expenses of maintenance, purchase from traders or manufacturers, and of manufacture in State factories (including costs of experiment, inspection, and design and subsidies to manufacturers) of goods, materials, and ammunition, whether complete or in parts, intended either for training purposes in peace time, or for completion or increase of mobilization, as expenses of creation and maintenance (in State or private hands) of stocks and plant useful only for purposes of construction of warlike stores." (It is notable that the Committee specifi-

cally mentioned the impossibility of making a distinction under this heading between new material and material maintenance.)

One heading is included under Land Forces only:

Training Expenditure -- this is not well-defined; it includes military schools and auxiliary forces but seems not to include training camps if they are used for any other purpose as well. The heading was dictated by the conclusions of Sub-commission A that training activities must be separately considered in assessing armament; and the Committee of Budgetary Experts makes it clear that under existing budgets this item cannot be determined with any degree of uniformity.

Two additional headings are given under Naval Forces only:

Expenditure on Naval Harbors and Bases, and
Expenditure on Hire of Vessels and Subsidies to the
Merchant Marine for Defense Purposes.

One heading appears under Air Forces only:

Subsidies to Air-Transport Undertakings -- this is included only in case any expenditure of this kind might be regarded, in pursuance of subsequent decisions by the Commission, as a national defense expenditure.

~~RESTRICTED~~

In addition to its major task of drawing up the Trial Model Statement, the Committee of Experts attempted to give technical answers to some of the problems left unanswered by the Joint Committee. They examined with particular care problems created by the variety of methods of accountancy and gave their opinion that none of these problems appeared so great as to hinder the use of their model statement. Similarly, they indicated that problems created by the practice of carrying forward budgetary credits from year to year were technical and fairly easy to manage under terms of the hypothetical Convention. They felt that the particular difficulty foreseen for non-industrial countries (i.e., having to purchase armament outside their own borders and being thus constrained to buy in large lots occasionally rather than on an annual basis) could be similarly dealt with as a special case.

On the other hand, the question of accounting for stocks of material already in existence was held to be incompatible with the framework for limitation of expenditure, at least on the basis of existing national accounting systems.

Similarly, limitation by categories and key items was tested and found wanting. A category (in this sense) meant such a large heading as "land material", which was to be regulated by an expenditure limitation in a Convention otherwise

verdict on the usefulness of such a combination. Key items had been suggested as a possibility by the Joint Commission; the experts considered them impractical. Any such items, they pointed out, would have to fulfill the following characteristics:

(1) "They must be directly ascertainable from published and audited accounts.

(2) "They must be characteristic of either (a) the whole or (b) certain specific elements of armament of each nation (in the sense that they rise with any increase of that armament or of the specific elements in question.)

(3) "They must be such that they rise immediately on an increase of armament, e.g., that the rise in the item of expenditure can not be postponed until the armament is actually mobilized nor spread over a long period of time.

(4) "They must be such that the rise following on an appreciable increase of armament is itself substantial and capable of being distinguished from any probable rise due to other temporary or secular causes."

Point (3) would eliminate all items of expenditure on stocks of finished or nearly-finished articles entering into ordinary commerce, because they could be acquired too quickly; on the other hand, the cost of buildings other than fortifications can be spread over too long a period. Generally speaking, raw materials can be stock-piled so as to circumvent

point (1); also, such buying could easily be caused by the other reasons mentioned in point (4). And, as for warships, aeroplanes, airships, or tanks, if their purchase is to be considered as a bench-mark of armament, direct limitation would be simpler than budgetary. Therefore the Committee decided that there were really no such key items as the Joint Commission had envisaged, at least not under existing methods of budgeting.

In submitting their report, and especially in drawing up their model statement, the Committee realized that it was, in a certain sense, working in a vacuum. (The one member who filed a minority report gave this vacuum as the reason for his dissent.) That is to say, the statement was drawn up before it was at all clear to what use it would be put. Thus, in itemizing a certain number of headings but excluding further detail, the Committee was not taking the position that limitation could be enforced separately on all the specified items but could not be enforced on smaller ones. Its only comment on this score was that separate limitation of land, sea, and air force expenditure should not prove difficult. In fact, in drawing up a Trial Model Statement the Committee was not even necessarily furthering budgetary limitation; the statement might very well be used merely to give publicity to expenditure.

(This was to be the proposal of the American delegation during later sessions.) The Committee had simply been given a certain number of more or less abstract problems; of these, the most important was: Could a standard model statement covering substantially all defense expenditure be drawn up by the various nations from the budgetary material ready at hand? To this problem the answer was clearly affirmative.

C. Second Report of the Committee of Experts on Budgetary Questions

During the third session of the Preparatory Commission,¹ the Trial Model Statement of the Committee of Budgetary Experts was attacked as too complicated. Therefore the Commission requested the Committee to continue its investigations, with the object of simplifying the statement but keeping it "such that the desired publicity would be assured".

In their next report, following these directions, the Committee of Experts condensed their three main tables and more than twenty sub-tables into one master table, with separate columns for metropolitan land forces, colonial land forces, metropolitan air forces, colonial air forces, total naval forces, and total formations organized on a military basis. Only the following major stub headings were retained:

Effectives

I. See Section III following.

Transport

Buildings

Warlike Stores

and only about a dozen sub-headings were grouped under them. In other words, the summary statement showed separately only about one hundred items as compared with over one thousand required in the earlier draft. However, this brief table had to be accompanied by a very detailed list of instructions indicating coverage. Thus, "from a technical point of view it is clear that each country, in order to fill in the return, will have to prepare a document showing the correspondence between the figures in the return and those in the budgets. Such a document will be the key to the operation of transferring the budget figures to the columns in the return. The Committee did not consider itself technically competent to decide whether these correspondence documents should be actually attached to the return." That is to say, whether the final statement is brief or full, approximately the same procedure of budget reconciliation will have to be carried out; essentially it is simply a question of how much of the process shall be compulsorily made public.

A few minor points were changed: civil aviation, police not organized on a military basis, and pensions were excluded finally instead of conditionally; and it was stated that sub-

sidies were not included as a separate category because the conditions which would give rise to them could be circumvented more easily by other methods.

III. DISCUSSIONS OF THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION, 1927-1930.

To a certain extent, the reports of the technical Sub-commissions on limitation of expenditure were in fact technical; at least they attempted to confine comment to the "absolute" value of such limitation and seldom compared the "relative" desirability of the budgetary method and all other methods. This latter question engaged the attention of the Preparatory Commission in its regular sessions, and discussions on the problem became extremely involved. The situation would have been sufficiently complex if the Commission had first decided which of the various alternative means of limitation -- overall budgetary limitation, item-by-item quantitative limitation, quantitative limitation of personnel plus budgetary limitation of material, etc. -- it wished to follow throughout, leaving details to be filled in only after the broad framework had been set up.

This method, however, was not followed.¹ Instead,

1. Although certain overall plans were presented, for instance the French Draft Convention, the British Draft Convention, and later at the Disarmament Conference, President Hoover's Plan, they were never concretely based on one method of limitation. Even more important, the general discussion was not focussed on such questions of principle. The two Soviet Plans for disarmament, on the other hand, were integrated; they were introduced with the express warning that unless their basic principles were accepted it would be pointless to discuss them in detail. However, these plans were never made the basis of the Commission's work. (The Soviet plans are discussed in Part Five).

discussion took place upon point after point of a synoptic draft (later a draft convention) pieced together from British and French original draft conventions augmented by scattered proposals from other delegations. Under such circumstances it was possible to deduce only by inference what methods would be approved in toto; seldom in the discussion, and never in the recorded voting was the Convention, as a whole, reduced to a bill of alternate choices for one of which each delegate had to opt.

A. Third Session of the Preparatory Commission

At the beginning of this session, both British and French delegations presented draft disarmament conventions. The French plan included separate chapters on limitation of effectives (by number), limitation of the period of service, limitation of air material, (by total horse-power), limitation of naval material (by total tonnage), and limitation of expenditure, the last of which is partially quoted below:

"Chapter V.

"Limitation of Expenditure

"Article 19.

"The total annual expenditure, counted per budgetary year and allocated according to Tables ...(Home forces and formations of the home country organized on a military basis) and...

(Overseas forces and their reinforcements and overseas formations organized on a military basis), shall not exceed the figures approved by the several Contracting States...

"Article 20.

"In each of the Contracting States, the total expenditure on the upkeep, purchase and manufacture of war material in the strict sense of the term for the duration of the present Treaty shall be limited for the land, naval and air armaments to the respective sums fixed in columns X, Y, and Z of Tables...

"The said sums shall be divided by the number of years for which the present Treaty is to remain in force, and in each of the Contracting States, the annual expenditure on the upkeep, purchase, and manufacture of war material in the strict sense of the term shall not exceed the figure laid down for each year; nevertheless, sums not expended during one year may be carried forward to the following year and added to the sums fixed for that year.

"Article 21.

"Each of the Contracting States will prepare an annual statement of the amount actually expended on its land, naval and air armaments during the preceding year and of the expenditure contemplated for the current year. This statement shall be in the form set out in the Tables...

"For the purposes of the exchange of information laid down in Chapter VI, the statement of budgetary estimates shall be communicated to the Secretary General of the League of Nations not later than three months after the entry into force of the legal provisions authorizing the expenditure, and the statement of the expenditure actually incurred shall be communicated at latest before the expiry of the...month following the end of the budgetary year and the full budgetary period."

In other words, the French draft followed closely the French ideas as expressed in Sub-commission A: there was to be limitation of overall expenditure; there was to be limitation of expenditure by categories; there was to be separate limitation of expenditure on new material; and, in addition, certain categories of armament were to be limited by other, more direct methods. For these, of necessity, the quantitative limit would set the budgetary limit rather than vice-versa. This accorded well with the French insistence that limitation for each state should be fixed separately, instead of by the application of any so-called "objective" standard criterion.

The British draft was very loosely organized. Chapter I (General) provided that each Contracting Party should limit its land, naval, and air armaments to the figures (quantitative) laid down in tables of the Convention. It also provided that:

"Each of the High Contracting Parties will, while the

present Convention is in force, communicate to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, not later than...in the year, in the form set out...a statement of the amount proposed to be expended on its land, naval, and air armaments in the current fiscal year.

"Each of the High Contracting Parties will, while the present Convention is in force, communicate to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, not later than...in each year, in the form set out...a statement showing the amount actually expended on its land, naval, and air armaments during the past fiscal year."

Succeeding chapters provided for limiting land armaments by limiting the number of effectives, for limiting naval armaments by limiting tonnage, and for limiting air armaments by limiting the number of aircraft. Thus, the British were suggesting quantitative limitation with budgetary publicity imposed as a means of high-lighting action contrary to the spirit of the law.

When the British and French Conventions were combined into a synoptic table, the four main chapter headings were Effectives, Naval Armaments, Air Armament, and Expenses. As a result, it became difficult to determine the exact scope of budgetary limitation; it was also unclear whether limitation of expenditure was to be applied in addition to, or in place

of, direct limitation of material.

Within this indistinct pattern, Germany, the United States, Sweden, and the Netherlands favored direct limitation of material and consequently opposed budgetary limitation. They advanced few new arguments. Germany, of course, opposed budgetary limitation for other nations so long as she herself was held to quantitative limitation under the Treaty of Versailles (and the French made it abundantly clear that nothing in the Disarmament Convention was to abrogate any treaty obligation). The Germans were also afraid that their present emaciated military budget might be set as their standard. The German delegate, Count Bernstorff, pointed out that budgetary limitation would not solve the problem of material in stock, but claimed that Germany was not opposed to budgetary limitation provided it were coupled with direct limitation of land material.

The United States posited that direct limitation was the only sound method. The United States refused, however, to countenance a control commission with powers of inspection; this refusal provided the French with one of their main arguments for indirect control. The Netherlands' delegate complained that often expenditure rose without a rise in armament (for instance, when the Dutch fleet manoeuvred in the East Indies); also, the method of freezing the military budget for a certain number of years had been proposed at an earlier date

in the League Assembly and was then rejected.

On the other hand, France, Belgium, and the cortège habituel of Balkan nations and Poland spoke vehemently in favor of budgetary (i.e., against direct) limitation. Their main contention seemed to be that direct limitation was impossible; therefore the budgetary measure should be adopted. According to the French, there were three methods of limiting effective armament; (1) a nation could train only a part of its annual manpower contingent; but this was not democratic and could not be stomached by the continental conscription powers; (2) stocks could be limited; but this would necessitate a control commission, to which certain states would not agree; and (3) the only other possibility was to limit expenditure. Belgium countered the objections of the Netherlands by claiming that there was a great difference between freezing existing budgetary expenditure and prescribing "equitable" budgetary expenditure. Poland supported budgetary limitation with the added proviso that there should be "suitable compensation" for states with small budgets.

The statements of Great Britain did not strongly support either method of limitation. Viscount Cecil, the British delegate, pointed out that overall budgetary limitation would not prevent aggression, since a power might shift the pattern of its armaments and thus prepare for attack within the limits

of the Convention. For reasons not clearly stated, he insisted that the same thing could hold good for limitation by categories: such categorical limitation would also force every state to ask for a maximum figure in each category to provide for flexibility. Accordingly, the British opposed budgetary limitation but admitted that it was wishful thinking to demand direct limitation.

At this juncture, it was clear that direct limitation was out of the question (since the Commission was working for unanimity). A nation such as Sweden was thereupon willing to accept budgetary control of material rather than no control at all. The situation of the United States and Germany was entirely different. It was imperative for the German delegate to demand for other nations the same sort of limitation that had been imposed on Germany. Mr. Gibson, the United States delegate, claimed that his country could not consent to budgetary limitation -- not only did the nation disapprove in principle (as expressed in the declaration to Sub-commission A), but such limitation was also a constitutional impossibility. As a substitute measure, therefore, he proposed giving the fullest publicity to budgetary expenditure on armaments. This proposal also suited the British. The Italian delegation, however, objected even to publicity, on the grounds that the Trial Model Statement drawn up by the Budgetary Experts was too com-

plicated and would induce unfair comparisons; he also objected to the principle of uniform extracts and thought that "frank and free exchange of information under the League" would be sufficient.

The outcome of all this argument was expressed in two articles of the Text drawn up at the First Reading of the Draft Convention, which was adopted at the close of the session as a basis for further work. Under Chapter II, "Material," Section I, "Land Armaments", two alternate drafts were listed. One, a German draft, drew up a table of land material for quantitative limitation based on the Treaty of Versailles. The other consisted of Articles 20 and 21 of the French Draft Convention, providing for indirect limitation. (The delegations of the United States, Italy, and Japan made general reservations to the Section.)

Under Chapter III, "Budgetary Expenditure", the Commission produced the following least common denominator:

"Whereas it is in the general interest that expenditures on armaments should be limited, and

"Whereas the High Contracting Parties are not agreed at present on any satisfactory method of accomplishing this object, and

"Whereas the High Contracting Parties consider that as a preliminary to such limitation of expenses, full publicity

should be secured so that on a future occasion it may be possible again to approach the question with better hope of success.

"Article DA

"Each of the High Contracting Parties will communicate to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, in a model form, a statement of the amount proposed to be expended on its land, naval, and air armaments in the current financial year.

"This communication shall not be made later than... months after the entry into force of the legal provisions authorizing the expenditure.

"Article DB

"Each of the High Contracting Parties will communicate to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, in model form, a statement showing the amount actually expended on its land, naval and air armaments during the preceding financial year.

"This communication will be made not later than... months after the close of the financial year."

The Commission, in view of the objections of the Italian delegate, suggested further work by the Committee of Budgetary Experts, the outcome of which has already been described in Section I.

B. Sixth Session of the Preparatory Commission, First Half.

At the Fourth and Fifth Sessions of the Preparatory Commission, the President had indicated that the time was not yet ripe for further discussions of the draft convention, since the various governments were engaged in direct discussions on the various problems which the Commission had exposed. However, in 1929, when the Sixth Session finally took up the Draft Convention, agreement was no nearer than before. This was certainly true of the principle of budgetary limitation. The question was raised in connection with land material, and the issue was more swiftly joined between the proponents of direct and of budgetary limitation. The same arguments were reiterated by the same advocates. Italy and Japan finally declared themselves in favor of indirect limitation, and Italy hinted that budgetary limitation might be applied to material in stock, but did not make any concrete proposal how this might be done. The United States stood firm against indirect limitation and was seconded more strongly at this time by Great Britain.

As a result, the conclusions reached at the first half of the Sixth Session were even more non-committal than the Text of the First Reading after the Third Session. Both the German and the French proposals under "Land Material" were expunged. to be replaced by the following proposal:

"The Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conferences,

"Having rejected the systems of direct limitation of material in service and in stock,

"Having noted that the system of indirect limitation (limitation of the expenditure on material) did not meet with general assent,

"Decides,

"That the limitation and reduction of material must be sought by means of publicity of expenditure, which will be dealt with in examining article DA of the text adopted at the first reading."

This proposal was finally accepted by the French and adopted by the Commission with only two dissenting votes, the USSR and China. The German delegate abstained from voting and issued an acrid declaration dissociating himself from the work of the Commission on this point.

C. Sixth Session of the Preparatory Commission, Second Half

Although the Sixth Session of the Preparatory Commission was not formally adjourned, it did not reconvene until November 1930 (18 months after its first meetings). In the meantime, the question of limitation of material had again been thrown open. Britain under a Labor government had performed this operation at the Tenth League Assembly, when Viscount Cecil

had introduced a resolution proposing (in part) that the Preparatory Commission should again apply itself to the question of "the limitation of material either directly by enumeration or indirectly by budgetary limitation, or by both methods." The French had bitterly attacked the whole resolution (as the Germans had warmly supported it), since its general tenor implied more stringent disarmament than the report of the Preparatory Commission. After several days of violent debate, the Assembly had adopted a colorless compromise resolution which nevertheless opened the forthcoming session of the Preparatory Commission to further discussion of formerly "closed" points.

Discussion was indeed forthcoming. In the interval, several nations had shifted position, and certain proposals had been generated. In fact, although the discussion was sometimes deeply involved in procedural difficulties, it retained a rather higher level of interest than before.

Viscount Cecil's initial declaration presented further evidence of Great Britain's change of heart: material would have to be limited in order successfully to limit armaments. Limitation by means of publicity was really already in effect (i.e., The Armaments Yearbook of the League of Nations) and was not accomplishing much. The direct method posed very grave technical difficulties: moreover, because of potential differ-

ences in quality of material it did not necessarily impose a real limitation (as proved by Germany's pocket battleship building); and it also introduced the ticklish problem of control. Still, Great Britain would not oppose direct limitation on certain larger classes of weapons, if some satisfactory method could be evolved; but such limitation must be supplemented on a wider scale. Therefore, Great Britain suggested a "rough-and-ready system" of budgetary limitation. No attempt should be made to bind armaments in detail. Instead, a global limit should be set for each branch of the service (air, sea, and land), and within these totals, there should also be set a limit for expenditure on material. These figures would never be used as a basis of comparison between different countries but as a basis of comparison between different periods of time in the same country. The findings of the Committee of Budgetary Experts indicated that such a proposal was feasible.

Italy had by this time joined the "revisionists" and was consequently favorably inclined towards direct limitation as a matter of courtesy. However, the Italian delegate declared that he was willing to support either direct or indirect limitation or both. He suggested placing a maximum quantitative limit on armament for every state and then fixing the maximum armament expenditure on this basis.

Hugh Gibson repeated the United States' "non possumus" of "constitutional ability." He added an alternative proposal: if other nations wished to limit their expenditure, the United States had no objection; and the other nations should have no objection to US non-participation, in view of American willingness to publicize armament expenditure and/or to accept direct limitation. The Spanish delegate approved of this plan and announced the willingness of his country to assume direct, but not indirect, limitation.

Japan, by this time, was opposed to either indirect or direct limitation of material, feeling that limitation of effectives was all that could be accepted. The Japanese delegate indicated that his nation would have accepted universal budgetary limitation; but he doubted that she would do so if certain other nations remained beyond the pale. He saw only two solutions: either nations unwilling to accept budgetary limitation should voluntarily accept direct limitation or all nations must revert to publicity. (Later, he qualified this statement by insisting that a nation which has undertaken direct limitation with no provision for supervision is really better off than a nation with budgetary limitation; also, the stocks of the former would not be indirectly limited by the cost of upkeep.)

The USSR had consistently favored direct limitation (to say nothing of more drastic methods) since joining the Preparatory Commission at the Fourth Session. Therefore, Litvinoff proposed that the first vote should be taken on the principle of quantitative limitation as representing the most comprehensive method. But if that proposal should be rejected, the Commission should next entertain a resolution for indirect limitation or for a combination of the two. Litvinoff pointed out that budgetary limitation would bear most heavily on small nations which had to buy abroad and that it did not solve the problem posed by large existing stock-piles.

The various Balkan nations again went on record in favor of budgetary limitation according to the French plan of many categories instead of the British global totals. Canada and Sweden preferred direct limitation but would compromise on budgetary limitation or on a combination of the two methods. Norway also was willing to compromise. Belgium backed the British proposal. Turkey announced her support of any plan which provided substantial exceptions in favor of non-industrial countries.

After several days of declaration and discussion, practically every nation had grown more sympathetic to indirect limitation, except for the Netherlands and Germany, which still insisted upon the need of quantitative reduction. It was also

clear that the USSR and Italy considered budgetary limitation a poor second and that the United States, although she would not oppose the method for others, was unwilling to accept it for herself. An interesting sidelight was provided by the French delegation; as the prospect of adopting some form of budgetary limitation drew nearer, it suggested further study by the Committee of Experts in order, it said, to plug all possible loopholes, to provide for elasticity by carry-over of credits, and so forth. By this time the French were firmly opposed to any combination of quantitative with budgetary limitation.

Finally, Viscount Cecil proposed the following resolution:

"The Commission

"1. Approves the principle that there should be the fullest possible interchange of information respecting armaments...;

"2. Records the unanimous desire of the members of the commission to find some method which will provide for the limitation of war material in a more precise manner than can be achieved by publicity alone;

"3. Accepts, so far as the majority is concerned, the principle of budgetary limitation for land war material, while recognizing that certain members prefer the method of direct

limitation by specific enumeration and that certain members would desire to see some combination of the two methods." The three parts were voted upon separately. Except for procedural difficulties, parts (1) and (2) engendered no dispute. Before voting on part (3), the Commission considered certain amendments which, in reality, amounted to alternative proposals.

The first of these was a Soviet resolution:

"The Preparatory Commission decides that the only effective means of reducing and limiting war material is the direct reduction and limitation of all kinds of war material according to detailed tables, together with budgetary limitation, by categories. The two methods should be applied simultaneously by all countries." This was voted down.¹

Next, the Italian delegation presented its resolution:

"The Commission considers that the best method for limitation of land material would consist in a combination of the two systems of direct limitation and budgetary limitation.

"Direct limitation will be applied separately to material

1. In favor were: Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, the USSR. Opposed were the United States, the British Empire, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Finland, France, Greece, Japan, Persia, Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia. Finland specified that it was opposed simply because no control provisions were included; Sweden objected to the mention of such detailed tables.

in stock and material in service. Two tables will indicate separately the armament categories of the material in stock and those of the material in service, together with the respective maximum figures fixed for each country. Budgetary limitation will be applied in accordance with the rules which are determined on the basis of the work of the Committee of Budgetary Questions."

The form of this resolution proved confusing. The Italians wished to engineer a separate vote on material in stock and material in service, but they were unsuccessful in this attempt. The resolution was voted down as a whole.¹

Last, the German delegation proposed the simple resolution that

"The Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conferences is of the opinion that the principle of direct limitation should be applied to land war material." This too was voted down.²

1. In favor were: Canada, Germany, the Irish Free State, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Turkey, the USSR and Venezuela; opposed were Belgium, the British Empire, Czechoslovakia, Finland, France, Japan, Persia, Poland, Rumania, Spain, and Yugoslavia; not voting were the United States, Bulgaria, China, Norway and Greece.

2. In favor were: the United States, Canada, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Turkey, the USSR, and Venezuela; opposed were Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Finland, France, Japan, Persia, Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia; not voting were the British Empire, Bulgaria, China, the Irish Free State, Greece, Norway

After this interruption, the Commission adopted part (3) of the British resolution. On the basis of this resolution, it next proceeded to embody the necessary articles in the Draft Convention. This gave rise to another spate of arguments, more or less retracing the ground just covered. Seemingly, the states which were in favor of direct limitation or of a combination of direct and indirect were most unwilling to agree on the wording of any proposal on indirect limitation for fear that to do so would compromise their previous stand. Also, the French delegation pressed its proposal to recommit to the technical committee the mechanics of indirect limitation; and Viscount Cecil reiterated his willingness to entertain proposals for direct proposals along with indirect.

Finally, new texts were adopted under "Part II - Material", chapters on land and on naval armaments, under "Part III - Budgetary Expenditure", and "Part IV - Exchange of Information". They read as follows:

"Part II. Material

"Chapter A. Land Armaments

"Article 10. (Provisional text...)

"The annual expenditure of each High Contracting Party on the upkeep, purchase, and manufacture of war material for land armaments shall be limited to the figures laid down for

such party and in accordance with the conditions prescribed,
in the annex...to this Article...1,2

"Chapter B. Naval Armaments...

"Article 24. (Provisional text...)

"The annual expenditure of each High Contracting Party
on the upkeep, purchase, and manufacture of war material for
naval armaments shall be limited to the figures laid down for
such Party, and in accordance with the conditions prescribed,
in Annex...1,3

"Part III. Budgetary Expenditure

"Article 29. (Provisional text...)

"The total annual expenditure of each of the High Con-
tracting Parties on his land, sea and air forces and forma-
tions organized on a military basis shall be limited to the

1. To these articles was appended the following note: "In pro-
nouncing on this article, the Governments will take into
account at the Conference the report requested from the Committee
of Budgetary Experts, which will have been forwarded to them
in order to permit of the drawing up of Annex..."
2. The following note was added to Article 10: "The Prepara-
tory Commission, by 16 votes to 3 and 6 abstentions, adopted
the principle of limitation by expenditure. It also discussed
the following resolution: German resolution; see p. 267. When
this resolution was put to the vote there were 9 votes in favor,
9 against and 7 abstentions. Lastly, it examined the principle
of a combination of the two methods, in favor of which 9 members
of the Commission voted, while 11 voted against."
3. The French, Japanese, German, British, and Italian delega-
tions expressed reservations of varying degrees on expenditure
limitation of naval material; also, it is clear that failure to
express a specific reservation did not necessarily indicate
approval: for instance, the United States had taken a position
against budgetary limitation and had expressed this stand in a
general opposition statement.

figure laid down for such Party and in accordance with the conditions prescribed in the Annex...

"Part IV. Exchange of Information...

"Article 33.

"Each of the High Contracting Parties shall, within... months from the end of each budgetary year, communicate to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations a statement drawn up in accordance with a standard model, showing by categories of materials the total actual expenditure in the course of said year on the upkeep, purchase and manufacture of war materials of the land, sea and air armed forces and formations organized on a military basis of such Party.

"The information contained in this statement shall be published by the Secretary-General...

"Article 34.

"Each of the High Contracting Parties shall communicate to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations within... months of the end of each budgetary year a statement drawn up in accordance with the standard model annexed to this Article showing the total amounts actually expended in the course of said year on the land, sea, and air armaments of such Party.

"The information supplied in this Statement shall be published by the Secretary-General..."

The Soviet delegation had submitted a draft text under

"Part III. Budgetary Expenditure" which embodied certain of its minority views:

"The total annual expenditure counted per budgetary year and allocated according to Tables...(home forces and formations of the home country organized on a military basis) and...(overseas forces and their reinforcements and overseas formations organized on a military basis) shall not exceed the figures approved by the several Contracting States in the present Convention, being reduced by an equal percentage; an exception being allowed, however, in favor of the States which are weakest from a military point of view and are specially mentioned in the present Convention, and of such States as have reduced their armaments in virtue of international agreements other than the present Convention...

"Secret funds...shall be excluded from the national budgets...All expenditure for the...armed forces of each State shall be shown in a single chapter of the national budget; their full publicity shall be ensured..."

In the course of the discussion, the Russians withdrew the first part of their resolution in favor of the British resolution (which was the one finally adopted) on the grounds that the Soviet text contained the principle of proportionality, which had been definitely rejected by the Commission. They

were also interested in adding precision by including the specific categories, Staff, Movements, Buildings, and War Materials, for which expenditure should be limited separately. However, their resolutions and amendments were voted down.

The French were successful in their request for further study by the Committee of Experts; the Commission adopted the following resolution:

"With a view to limiting Land War Material by limiting expenditure on its purchase, manufacture, and upkeep, the Preparatory Commission requests its President to instruct the Committee of Budgetary Experts to inquire into the means by which such limitation could be carried out, paying special attention to:

"(a) The necessity of limiting all the expenditure in question;

"(b) The variety of ways in which budgets are presented and discussed in different countries;

"(c) The adjustment of the proposed method of limitation to possible fluctuations in the purchasing power of different countries, especially with regard to the cost of war material;

"(d) The conditions in which credits for one financial year might be carried over to the following year or years..."

(The resolution was later expanded to cover (1) budgetary

limitation of naval armament, (2) the proposal of limiting land, sea, and air forces separately under Article 29 of the Draft Convention.) However, it was decided that the report of the Committee of Experts should be submitted to the Disarmament Conference itself rather than to the Preparatory Commission, in order not to delay the convening of the Conference. The Preparatory Commission finally wound up its affairs, after five years of existence, with the end of the Sixth Session.

D. Conference on the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, 1931-1933¹

Despite the large amount of effort and argument which had crystallized around the proposal of budgetary limitation throughout the preceding years, the Disarmament Conference proper left the subject almost completely untouched. At the beginning of the Conference, the topic was given a lukewarm blessing by enough delegations so that "it seemed likely that all countries were likely to accept budgetary limitation."² A change in the position of the US delegation was particularly important; no more mention was made of "constitutional impossibility" and the United States was declared willing to consider proposals for limitation of expenditure on armament.

1. The Disarmament Conference was not formally terminated in 1933; however, the withdrawal of the German delegation in 1933 ended any pretense of accomplishment.

2. Wheeler-Bennett, J.W., quoting Arthur Henderson, President of the Conference, in *Pipe-Dream of Peace*.

Accordingly, the Conference set up a Sub-commission of National Expenditure, which in its turn constituted another Subcommittee of eleven experts to examine the replies received from Governments regarding armaments expenditure.¹

After this, however, budgetary limitation dropped further and further into the background. The proposals which were discussed in most detail in the Conference in the first session (President Hoover's Plan) were concerned with "quantitative and qualitative" measures: i.e., armament should be directly limited and certain peculiarly aggressive categories should be abolished entirely, as in the Treaty of Versailles. By 1933 the struggle of the German delegation for "equality of treatment" was engaging the full attention of the Conference; and the paramount consideration of all proposals was whether or not this equality should be granted (or, to put it more bluntly, how to work resolutions so as to offer just enough hope of equality to hold Germany in line but not such substantial concessions as would alarm France). A French plan vaguely suggesting budgetary limitation was tabled almost without discussion; a British Draft Convention made no mention of expenditure.

Throughout 1933 the situation of the Disarmament Conference.

1. See Section III for the work of this Sub-commission.

ence became more and more hopeless; the German delegation finally withdrew from the Conference in October.

IV. FURTHER COMMITTEE REPORTS

Although any serious prospect of employing the method of budgetary limitation of armament ended with the sixth session of the Preparatory Commission, the technical sub-commissions of the Commission and of the Conference turned out some further reports on the subject.

A. Third Report of the Committee of Experts on Budgetary Questions

The third report of the Committee of Budgetary Experts is the most detailed and conclusive of the series. It indicates the shape which budgetary limitation would probably have assumed, had the Draft Convention been converted into a reality. A summary of this report shows that the Committee had answered practically all the technical problems which had been raised concerning budgetary limitation.

The first problem before the Committee was to revamp its former model statements, intended only for publicizing expenditure, in a form which could be used for controlling expenditure. Few changes were needed: substantially the same type of master table which had appeared in the Committee's Second Report¹ was retained; but only the headings on warlike stores and the

¹. See p. 48 above.

grand totals for each branch of military service were to serve as control figures.

The Experts expressly stated their belief that expenditure could be separated in this fashion according to land, sea, and air branches of service and that war material could be limited as a special category. On the other hand, they believed that it would be impossible to separate expenditure on new material from expenditure on upkeep of material (as was required by Article 33 of the Draft Convention): the difficulty of drawing the line between renewing part of an item and replacing the whole item was too great; and there were insoluble differences in accounting methods when material was manufactured in state arsenals from when it was purchased from independent factories.

With this reservation, the Committee pointed out that the other figures in the Master Table, or perhaps an even fuller tabulation (such, for instance, as the Trial Model Statement in its first report¹) might very well be submitted under Part IV of the Draft Convention providing for exchange of information.

Two methods were suggested for providing flexibility between branches of the service: (1) The allowance for global totals could be smaller than the sum of the three branch-of-service totals (i.e., each branch would contain a margin of

1. See p. 41 above.

leeway): (2) Or, a state could be allowed to shift about a certain percentage of the total allowed under each branch.

A certain leeway should also be provided for fluctuations from one year to the next, with special consideration for states which must buy abroad; otherwise states would be forced to ask for a maximum yearly limit. However, the percentage of elasticity should be small, as, in case of an emergency, a state could request and be granted a special temporary increase in expenditure.

Instructions on filling out the Master Table from state accounts were developed in great detail; and a reconciliation table was mapped out to be used in converting budget or closed-account figures into the form of the Master Table. The Committee decided that the nearest approach to uniformity of coverage in the reports could be obtained if every state, following these instructions insofar as possible, prepared a model statement on the basis of its latest closed accounts. Then these model statements would be presented to the Disarmament Conference as a standard of future procedure.

The Committee believed that the question of covering "secret funds" would most easily be solved by incorporating in the Convention itself a provision that all expenditure for armament, classified according to its true utilization should be included in the figures of the Master Table. The same

method might serve for military expenditure not covered by the military budget (for instance, autonomous State corporations) and even for extra-budgetary expenditure. Whenever some such expenditure could not be included in the reported figures for technical reasons, this should be mentioned in the description of method.

Next, the Committee attacked a series of accounting problems:

Gross expenditure must be used in drawing up the Master Table.

The Master Table will be expressed, as is the budget, in terms of the state's domestic currency.

Although returns of estimated expenditure are called for under the provisions for exchange of information, from the standpoint of control, the Committee saw little reason for submitting them. Expenditure must be defined as "cash disbursements," not as legislative authorizations or departmental commitments. There are three reasons for this choice: (1) Cash disbursements are most comparable between states. (2) Most countries keep accounting records on a cash disbursal basis. (3) If this system is adopted, the practice of carrying over parliamentary credits from one year to the next has no bearing on the juridical machinery of limitation.

This last point raises the problem of purposely deferred

payments. However, any nation which attempted to exceed its Convention limits by deferring payments at the end of one year would be pinched in proportion at the end of the next. There are, in addition, several mechanisms by which such a practice could be controlled: (1) The states could assume an obligation in the Convention not to act in such a fashion. (2) Outstanding purchases on credit could be included in the Master Table. (3) A supplementary record of purchases on credit and deferred payments could be appended to the Master Tables, if the latter covered only cash expenditure. The Committee favored the last method because it would be simpler and more accurate.

A final accounting problem occurs in nations whose final accounts are not audited for a long period after the close of the budgetary year. The Committee suggested that, in such a case, the state might have to prepare vouched-for, but unaudited accounts for the disarmament authorities, to be replaced by the audited accounts when they became available.

Finally, the Committee dealt at some length with two subsidiary questions: changes in the purchasing power of a state's currency, and subsidy payments.

The Committee could devise no standard mechanism for adjusting budget limits to changes in purchasing power. No existing index of prices or cost-of-living could be correlated with the cost of armaments. Attempts to construct such an

index, which would be automatically applicable to all states, were unsuccessful. Therefore, it was suggested that the Convention should include a procedure under which a state could petition the permanent disarmament council for readjustment of its budget allowance. Special circumstances calling for consideration after such a petition might be:

- (1) Inflationary developments in a country off the gold standard;
- (2) General increase of salaries and wages;
- (3) "Question of whether or not the increase in the pay to the defense personnel represents an endeavor to increase the quality of the defense services";
- (4) Question of whether or not the increase in pay to the defense personnel is accompanied by an increase in pay in the civil service;
- (5) Changes in wage levels, prices of necessary raw materials, and methods of production affecting the price of war material;
- (6) The question whether economies have been effected as a result of rationalization;
- (7) The question whether an apparent increase in cost is not due to an improvement in quality, in which case it should not lead to readjustment in figures;
- (8) The question, in case of countries purchasing abroad,

of price increases in the vendor nations.

The discussion of subsidy payments is quoted in some detail:

"1. The Committee has devoted close attention to the problem of state subsidies for armament purposes and to a series of equivalent measures in the form of loans to, or state participation in, establishments having among their objects the furnishing of goods or services for national defense. In modern times there has been a marked tendency in many States to increase such participations under varying forms and even to pursue State activities in the legal form of private enterprises.

"For example, as regards participation in joint-stock companies, this might be effected by the subscription of capital shares, for cash or other consideration, or by buying such shares later; or by conceding to the company the ownership or use of certain installations or rights and privileges of all kinds, and receiving in exchange, in place of shares, rights of control or participation in profits; or lastly, by the granting of subsidies or long or short term loans, etc...

"It is obvious that measures of this kind can be fully equivalent, for instance, to the erection by the State itself of a State factory for the manufacture of war material. For this reason, the Committee has laid down the principle that

these subsidies, loans, and participations (including purchases of shares, debentures, etc., whether for cash or other consideration) in establishments having among their objects the furnishing of goods or services for national defense, shall be treated as expenditure on such goods or services, and that the amounts involved shall consequently be included in the appropriate categories in the model statement and be made subject to the limitation to be agreed in the Convention.

"When a subsidy is given in an establishment to enable it to adapt its plant and organization for deliveries in case of war, such a subsidy should be considered as expenditure to be included in the model statement, even when no deliveries take place immediately.

"2. But it is equally obvious that, in certain cases, subsidies and loans may be granted, or shares, etc., may be taken up, which are clearly unconnected with armaments...in particular...when measures are taken up which, while applying equally to establishments...for national defense and to other establishments, are nevertheless based on general economic, fiscal, or social considerations.

"In the case of loans it must also be considered that certain short-time credits...have no effect in increasing armaments and that they, therefore, should not be included in defense expenditure in the model statement...on the condition

that these advances are purely temporary and that they are not renewed...

"3. The question might arise whether, after having included a loan to such undertakings in its national defense expenditure, the State concerned would not be justified in afterwards deducting from that expenditure the amount refunded in respect of such a loan...It would seem, however, that...it would be dangerous to permit the deduction...

"4. It cannot be denied that, in practice, many doubtful cases may arise. It should naturally be left to the responsibility of each contracting party to make the necessary exclusions, but the Committee thinks that it would be useful if full publicity were given all the cases which they had not included in the returns of national defense expenditure...

"The Committee attaches great importance to this suggestion...A provision regarding publicity has accordingly been inserted...as an essential element of the Committee's proposal."

The Committee concluded its report on a note of optimism in regard to the prospects of finding the solution of the technical problems of budgetary limitation.

B. Report of the National Defense Expenditure Committee

The work of the National Defense Expenditure Committee was based on the examination of state budgets. Twenty-seven were submitted to it for study; it succeeded in examining 19,

including those of all the significant military powers. It published its findings in a massive three-volume report, amplified by descriptions of all the budgets it had examined.

The conclusions reached by the Commission after all this research almost exactly paralleled those of the Committee of Experts on Budgetary Questions. (In fact, the latter worked with the Commission as technicians). The National Defense Expenditure Commission expressed dissent on only one point: its members were dubious about the possibility of limiting war material separately. They believed that such a breakdown of expenditure--and even the more detailed breakdown shown in the Model Statements--could indeed be made; but it could not be verified against the closed published state accounts as successfully as could the grand totals.

The Commission discussed a few minor points which had not been mentioned before. For instance, it thought that military expenditure following a disaster, such as a flood, should be excepted from limitation *since* such expense would not contribute to an increase of armament. Similarly, it pointed out that any state which incurred additional expenditure because of a decrease in armament (transition costs, for instance, arising from a reorganization of the army) should be able to exclude this expenditure from limitation.

But these were minor reservations. Taken

this latest technical report strongly reinforced its predecessor, bringing to the support of its conclusions a mass of budgetary and economic data.¹

1. The preceding technical commissions, had, of course, consulted the budgets of the various nations; their members were budgetary experts of these nations. But the National Defense Expenditure Commission was the first to incorporate such data citing chapter and verse into its report to the Conference.

PART FIVE: SOVIET PROPOSALS DURING THE DISARMAMENT
NEGOTIATIONS, 1927-1933

I. INTRODUCTION

The two Soviet disarmament plans came as an interruption to the standardized pattern of disarmament negotiations during the post-war decade. The Soviet Government had at first refused to participate in meetings of the Preparatory Commission (on the grounds that their location in Switzerland could not be accepted by the USSR);¹ after a series of diplomatic exchanges, however, the Soviet delegates finally joined the Commission for its fourth session, in November 1927, and thereafter suggested two new and distinct methods of disarmament. The Soviet plans differed from the methods currently under consideration by the Commission mainly in their more drastic and unified approach.

II. SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR THE COMPLETE ABOLITION
OF ARMAMENTS

The Soviet delegates first offered to the Preparatory Commission a sweeping proposal for total and immediate disarmament. They advocated the dissolution of all armed forces, the destruction of all weapons and supplies, the scrapping of all warships and military planes, the abolition of military train-

¹. A Soviet representative at an earlier conference at Lausanne had been assassinated by a White Russian exile; and the Swiss court had refused to convict the assassin.

ing, the destruction of fortresses and air bases, and the scrapping of military plants and factories and of war industrial equipment in general industrial works. No more funds should be assigned to military bodies, and there should be no more ministries of war. Legislation to this effect should be enacted in each country. There should also be prohibitions against military propaganda and the patenting of armament designs, with infringement constituting a crime against the state. Abolition of armaments should be brought about preferably within one year, but certainly within four.

Litvinoff, head of the Soviet delegation, stressed the urgent need for such a plan. He pointed to the constant rearmament already taking place as evidenced by the increase of military budgets. He declared that difficulties involved in adopting the Soviet plan would be easier to solve than those which were arising out of the current plans and procedure of the Preparatory Commission; and he urged that a Draft Convention embodying the Soviet proposals be drawn up and adopted by the Commission.

The reception given the Soviet proposals was far from enthusiastic, although the other delegates expressed their approval of total disarmament as a worthy ideal. M. Paul-Boncour, head of the French delegation, summarized the main body of criticism: (1) adopting the Soviet approach amounted to

changing horses in midstream; (2) since the proposals failed to take into account the question of "war potential", they would actually leave small nations at the mercy of big ones; and (3) the proposals ignored the link between disarmament and security; security must come first, since disarmament alone would not prevent war."

The Soviet delegates pointed out, in answer to the latter point, that they had made no claim that their plan would prevent war; but even if war should come about after general disarmament, the position of the various nations would certainly not be worse than at present. The burden of armaments would have been lessened in the meantime, and, since a League of States would still be stronger than a single state, there would be at least as much security as before.

After brief discussion, the Commission voted to defer until the next session consideration of the proposed Soviet draft convention. Accordingly, at the Fifth Session, Litvinoff presented to the Commission the Draft Convention for Immediate, Complete, and General Disarmament. Its main provisions are summarized below:

A. Effectives

Each signatory nation should agree to reduce its effectives by half within the first year after the Convention came into force and to disband the remainder within the next three years. (The term "effectives" covered all branches of the service, home and colonial troops, and trained reserves).

The Ministries of War, Navy, and Marine should be abolished; all records concerning trained reserves and mobilization should be destroyed, and all laws concerning compulsory military service should be abrogated. Budgetary credits must be confined within the limits of the Convention.

B. Armament

Each nation should agree to destroy all its reserves of listed items¹ of land armament within the first year after the coming into force of the convention; tanks and poison-gas equipment were to be destroyed first. Only those arms could be retained which were strictly necessary for the use of the number of effectives retained; and within the succeeding three years these armaments were to be destroyed in proportion to the disbandment of the effectives. No new armament could be constructed. All existing armaments contracts were to be cancelled, and no new ones could be made. Thus at the end of four years no armament would be in existence (with certain minor exceptions for personal arms in proportion to population).

Similarly, all capital ships, cruisers, aircraft carriers, and submarines should be withdrawn from the naval effectives within the first year; within the next three years all other war vessels were to be withdrawn and their personnel disbanded. The merchant marine should be completely disarmed.

All bombing planes, torpedo-carriers, and dirigibles (and their munitions) should also be destroyed the first year. Within the next three years, this provision would be extended to cover all aircraft that could not be converted to peaceful use. Aircraft for peace should be allowed only in accordance with strictly social and economic requirements; their number should be determined by a special convention.

All fortifications should be destroyed.

1. The listed items included substantially all land armaments: automatic rifles, machine guns, mine throwers and bomb throwers, revolvers and automatics, rifles and hand grenades, rifle and revolver ammunition, guns of all types and calibres and ammunition for them, tanks, gunpowder and explosives, poison gas, flame throwers, and "all technical military implements not enumerated...and intended for the wounding and destruction of man by man as well as all parts of the articles enumerated above."

C. Military Industries¹

All military industries should be abolished, except those necessary to produce the "minimum of arms and ammunition necessary for police forces...and for the personal use of citizens..."; this production should be governed under a special convention.

D. Protection Forces

For four years protection forces (police, etc.) should be held at the levels obtaining at the date of the Convention. After that, the effectives of these categories should be determined "in conformity with the population...the length of the means of communication...the existence of objects which are deemed by the state to require protection, the development of forestry, etc." No protection forces should be organized on a military basis.

Protection at sea should be undertaken, after four years, by a maritime police service organized under a special convention and "intended for necessary protection of the natural products of the sea, and of submarine cables, and suppression of piracy and of the slave trade, and other objects which may in future form the subject of international protection on the high seas." For this purpose, the seas should be divided into sixteen zones, each of which would be protected by "regional groupings [of states] having access to the waters."

E. Control

Control of disarmament should be vested in a Permanent

I. In a memorandum accompanying the Draft Convention, the matter of military industries was somewhat more thoroughly discussed; "...the question of the destruction of military industries is particularly complicated, because a highly developed industry conceals great potential forces for the production of armaments. Here again, however, there are a number of essential elements by the destruction of which the manufacture of armaments can be made very difficult. These include drawings, measuring instruments, models, frames, machines, tools, and appliances especially designed for the manufacture of armaments. Further, the actual demilitarization of military factories, their use for the manufacture of non-military products, the employment in other factories or plant that is not specifically military, and the destruction of everything necessary for mobilization perhaps will make it a very complicated matter to use these factories for war purposes."

International Commission of Control, Commissions of Control in each of the contracting states, and local Commissions within states. The membership of the International Commission would consist of an equal number of representatives of the legislative bodies and of the trade unions and other workmen's organizations of all the states participating. The membership of the National Commissions would be similar, plus representatives appointed by the International Commission. The Control Bodies would supply coordinating and technical as well as strictly regulatory functions.

F. Breach of the Convention

In case of a direct breach, an extraordinary assembly of the representatives of the contracting states should be summoned to decide upon the steps to be taken. These must not be of a military character. Disputes between states over performance of the Convention should be settled by the Permanent Commission of Control.

The Draft Convention was attacked from all sides. Only the German delegate, Count Bernstorff, gave it his approval. The same arguments which had been used at the Fourth Session were repeated and several new ones were suggested. Lord Cushtendon, the British delegate, made the principal opposing speech. He objected to the spirit in which the Draft Convention had been offered, indicating that it was irreconcilable with the Bolsheviks' declared war on capitalism; and he laid much emphasis on the impracticality of the proposals. Also, he made a number of more specific criticisms: (1) since the Preparatory Commission was working under League auspices, no proposal was in order which went outside the League for its enforcing mechanism; (2) the Soviet Draft Convention did not take into account the possible necessity of dealing with civil

war within a nation; (3) nor did it take into account the "special circumstances" arising out of dependent nations; (4) if protection forces were proportional to population and length of the lines of communication, the USSR would have a tremendous comparative advantage; (5) the provision for some manufacture of private arms was open to suspicion; and so forth.

Delegates of other nations,¹ speaking in opposition to the Draft Convention, added a few objections. It was feared that these new arrangements would disturb the existing balance of power; it was pointed out that enough armed forces were left under the guise of protection forces to do a considerable amount of fighting; and there was constant repetition of the belief that disarmament must "follow naturally" upon greater security and understanding between nations, that a total disarmament scheme would work only if there were a perfect plan for settling disputes otherwise, and if there were social and economic security as well as military security.

M. Litvinoff energetically offered rebuttals to these objections. He emphasized the lack of foundation of the two main lines of opposition:

1. Italy, France, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United States, Poland, Belgium, Cuba, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Finland, Argentina, Chile.

"The gist of the arguments...against the general idea of our project is that either the people will 'rage furiously together', both without arms or with primitive weapons, or that the more industrially developed countries will be able very rapidly to substitute for the destroyed armaments new ones, and, by infringement of the Convention, to enslave the weaker countries. It seems to me...that our opponents have already dropped the first of these arguments...The country which I represent has at its frontiers States numerically stronger than itself, such as China and India...and yet we have no fear of invasion by the unorganized masses of these countries...The second argument will also not hold water, for as it is, the weaker states, while obliged to maintain armed forces and resist possible attack by stronger States, are at the same time in complete dependence on the latter for their military supplies, besides being weak both technically and as regards their human resources. Fresh equipment for armies cannot be created at a moment's notice. Granted the time taken, this cannot go unnoticed..."

However, Litvinoff admitted the validity of the objections to the protection forces. "...a very legitimate question [Is]...the fear that, in arming the police in proportion to the population, the bigger countries might be in possession of a considerably greater armed force than the smaller, which

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might be used for warlike purposes...The Soviet delegation is therefore ready to change the proportion in the interests of the weakest States. If the Soviet delegation were to present any scheme for partial disarmament whatsoever, it would propose this very principle of a higher degree of disarmament for bigger countries..."

The irritation of the other delegates against the Soviet Convention was in large measure a consequence of their belief that the proposals were merely a device to expose the unwillingness of the capitalist countries to disarm. (An example of this point is clearly presented in the comments of one of the members of the British delegation: "They [The Soviet proposals] were frankly propaganda...M. Litvinoff's main object was to try to secure a vote against this disarmament proposal and to proclaim to the world that no capitalist country would have it. The political delegates were quite competent to deal with this manoeuvre and passed a resolution affirming their interest in the proposal but stating that it was unacceptable as a basis of their work, which must proceed on the lines laid down."1

III. SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR PARTIAL DISARMAMENT (THE PROPORTIONAL-PERCENTAGE PLAN)

After the Draft Convention for the Total Abolition of
I. Temperley, Maj. Gen. A. C., The Whispering Gallery of Europe

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Armament had been shelved, the Soviet delegation announced that the Government of the USSR, though regretting that the Disarmament Commission was opposed to total disarmament, was still willing to discuss partial disarmament. However, the Soviet Government regarded partial disarmament as only the first step towards total disarmament. On this basis the delegation immediately introduced a new Draft Convention, with the reservation that a successive partial disarmament could be brought up for consideration after a two-year period. (Discussion of the Second Soviet Draft, however, was deferred until the Sixth Session of the Commission.)

The Second Soviet Draft Convention made use of the idea of "proportional percentage" reduction suggested by Litvinoff's reply to the criticisms of the earlier Soviet proposals. The guiding principle was that in a partial reduction of armament the most heavily armed powers should submit to more drastic reduction than the less heavily armed. Accordingly, nations were to be divided into categories according to their armed strength; and the percentage by which armament must be reduced (called the "coefficient of reduction") was fixed separately for each category with the highest percentage applying to the category of greatest military strength. The principle was applied somewhat differently to land, sea, and air force reduction. The principal points of this plan are summarized below:

A. Armed Land Forces: Effectives

The signatory nations were to be grouped according to the size of their armies on a specific (past) date: Group A would include nations with land armies of 200,000 or over; Group B, nations with armies of 40,000 to 200,000; and Group C nations with armies less than 40,000;¹ there was also a special Group D, consisting of states disarmed after the World War. Armies in Group A were to be reduced by 50 percent; in Group B, by 33 1/3 percent; and in Group C, by 25 percent. The size of the armies of Group D nations should be fixed under special conditions to be determined by the Disarmament Conference.

The "coefficient of reduction" was to be applied separately to each category of armed forces -- to the total number of armed forces stationed at home, stationed in occupied territories, stationed in colonies, to the total number of commissioned and of non-commissioned officers, and to the total number of units and corps of each category of troops. In other words, the intent of the Convention was to "freeze" the existing pattern of the army and make sure that the reduction affects all parts of the pattern equally.

After the reduction had been effected, the size of the army (according to the same categories) should be held within these maximum limits, which would be embodied in a Supplementary Convention.

In order to limit the number of trained reserves, the number of persons in each age class to receive military training should be reduced by the same group coefficient. No civil bodies could be organized on a military basis or receive military training.

B. Armed Land Forces: Materiel

As a preliminary measure, all tanks and long-range artillery should be abolished, since they are primarily weapons of aggression. Similarly implements of gas warfare should be abolished, and all nations should sign the convention prohibit-

¹ Some alternative definitions were provided: Group A to consist of any nation with a land army which has 200,000 men or over, or, which has 10,000 regular officers, or which has 60 regiments of infantry. For Group B the alternate lower limits were 2,000 regular officers or 20 regiments of infantry.

ing the use of chemical warfare drawn up by the Third Commission of the League of Nations..

The pattern of land armament should then be frozen as of the same past date used in determining the number of land effectives. Then a reduction should be made, proportional to the reduced size of peace-time armies and to the reduced number of trained reserves. After the reduction had been effected, the maximum limits should be set at that point in a fashion similar to that used for effectives.

C. Naval Forces

Nations should be divided into two categories according to whether their aggregate tonnage (as of the certain date) were over or below 200,000. Nations in the first class should reduce overall tonnage by 50 percent; the reduction must also amount to 50 percent of the tonnage in each of the following classes:

- capital ships
- capital warships over 10,000 tons
- light forces
- submarines

Countries in the second class should reduce aggregate tonnage by one-fourth. Special arrangements were to be made for those nations disarmed by the Peace Treaties.

Aircraft carriers should be abolished.. Replacement of naval armament should also be regulated by the convention. No ships under a certain age (differing for different classes of ships) were to be eligible for replacement. The maximum displacement of ships of each class built for replacement was fixed under the terms of the treaty (the highest allowed displacement being 10,000 metric tons); the maximum gun calibres were also fixed for each type of vessel.

Various regulations were designed to prevent the transfer of ships in any manner that would circumvent the provisions of the Convention.

D. Air Forces

All aircraft and dirigibles should be disarmed, and all stocks of aviation bombs and ammunition destroyed.

States should be divided into three groups according to

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the size of their air forces: states with over 200 planes should reduce that number by 50 percent; states with 100 and less than 200 planes should reduce by 33 1/3 percent; and states with less than 100 planes, by 25 percent. Effectives of the military air forces should be reduced in proportion. Restrictions would be placed on engine horse power.

E. Chemical Warfare

All stocks of military chemicals -- i.e., poison gases -- should be abolished, all factories for their manufacture converted to other uses, and all states should sign the League Protocol on Chemical Warfare.

F. Armament Budgets

The total amounts of the armament budgets "calculated at their true value" should be reduced in proportion to the reduction of land, sea, and air forces specified under the convention. The degree of reduction should also apply to the expenditure on personnel and on armaments. No secret funds to cover extraordinary expenditure or special preparations for war should be excluded from the State budgets. All expenditure on the upkeep of the armed forces should be brought together in a single chapter of the State budget, which would be fully open to publicity. The reduction of the armaments budgets should be carried out pari passu with the reduction of armed forces and of war material. When the reduction had been effected, a maximum figure for budget expenditure should be fixed separately for each contracting state, not thereafter to be exceeded.

Provisions on control and on action following a breach of the convention were similar to those in the First Soviet Draft Convention. Provision was also made for a second disarmament convention to meet at a stated period of time after the adoption of the Convention to consider further reductions.

In introducing the Soviet Draft Convention, Litvinoff laid much emphasis on the standardized, objective nature of the proportional-percentage criterion. He declared that

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previous experience had clearly revealed the impossibility of considering each nation as a separate case in establishing armament limits: "All countries were found to be in a special position and there were some which actually claimed the existence of special obligations, frequently self-imposed. In a state of affairs when all countries are found to be in one way or another in a special position, owing to individual causes, the need for seeking some criterion which should be independent of subjective factors, cause no detriment to any State, and by which no attempt is made to solve the insoluble problem of arriving at a general agreement for the alteration of existing relative forces becomes obvious. It is only the Soviet Draft Convention...that furnishes such a criterion."

Opposition to the Second Soviet Draft indicated how strongly the French bloc of nations insisted on just this type of individual consideration. Otherwise the arguments followed very closely those advanced against the Soviet plan for total disarmament: the Soviet Convention was impractical, it did not fall within the framework of the League, and consideration of it would interrupt the already established Draft Convention which the Preparatory Commission was using as its frame of reference. The outcome of the discussion was much the same as before: the Commission commended the intention of the Draft, but refused to use it as a basis of further work. A suggestion

was also made that separate articles from the Soviet Draft might be inserted into the accepted Draft Convention. However, Litvinoff made it clear that, if such a procedure were to be followed, the Soviet government would not be held responsible for the articles used out of context; the Draft Convention had to be accepted, in major outline at least, as a unified whole.

Later, at the Disarmament Convention, the Soviet delegation again advanced its Draft Convention for the Reduction of Armaments in a slightly amended form. Changes had been made to meet the criticism that states on the borderline between different categories might have their relative strengths reversed by the application of two different reduction coefficients.¹ Litvinoff had previously claimed that the dividing lines had been carefully selected to obviate such cases; but the amended Draft would make them absolutely impossible. For States in Group A, the reduction coefficient remained 50 percent; for Group B, however, a sliding scale of reduction would be applied, ranging from a 50 percent reduction for the largest armies in the group down to no reduction for the smallest. The armies in Group C were to be frozen at their

1. For example, if State X had 220,000 men in its army and State Y 180,000 men, before applying reduction coefficients after reduction State X would retain only 110,000 men, whereas State Y would now possess 120,000.

strength as of the given date. Similar adjustments were made in naval and air force reduction coefficients.

The Soviet Draft Convention for the Reduction of Armaments was not considered at the Disarmament Conference; in fact, even the Draft Convention adopted by the Preparatory Commission was soon by-passed. The discussion developed along quite dissimilar -- and ultimately ineffective lines -- of which the Soviet delegation became sharply critical.

APPENDIX A. ARTICLES FROM THE COVENANT OF THE
LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Article I.

"Any...State...may become a member of the League... provided that.../It/ shall accept such regulations as may be prescribed by the League in regard to its military, naval, and air forces and armaments."

Article VIII.

"The members of the League recognize that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.

"The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and circumstances of each state, shall formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several governments.

"Such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and revision at least every ten years.

"After these plans shall have been adopted by the several governments, the limits of therein fixed shall not be exceeded without the concurrence of the Council.

"The members of the League agree that the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections. The Council shall advise how the

evils attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had to the needs of those members of the League which are not able to manufacture the munitions and implements of war necessary for their safety.

"The members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments and military, naval, and air programs and the conditions of such of their industries as are adaptable to war purposes."

Article IX.

"A permanent military commission shall be constituted to advise the Council on the execution of the provisions of Articles I and VIII and on military, naval, and air questions in general."

APPENDIX B. QUESTION V (a) OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE

In 1925 the Council of the League of Nations submitted a Questionnaire to "determine to some extent the direction of work" of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference. Question V (a) read:

"On what principle will it be possible to draw up a scale of armaments permissible to the various countries, taking into account particularly:

1. Population
2. Resources
3. Geographical situation
4. Nature and length of maritime communications
5. Density and character of railways
6. Vulnerability of the frontiers and of the important vital centers near the frontiers
7. The time required, varying with different States, to transform peace armaments into war armaments?

The Questionnaire was referred by the Preparatory Commission to both of its sub-commissions. In its final report, Sub-commission A¹ made the following answer regarding point 6 of Question V (a):

1. Sub-commission A was set up to deal with the technical military aspect of disarmament.

"Influence of the Number of Inhabitants"

"The considerable importance of the size of the population has already been pointed out (see the answer to Question I)¹, since modern war calls into play all the national human resources...taking into account overseas population as a means of supply or of immobilizing forces...and taking equality into account the military instruction of the population."

"With certain reservations one may state that:

"a. The number of inhabitants influences in a direct but variable fashion -- variable with circumstances and with the degree of loyalty of the population the number of effectives intended to assure internal security either of the metropolitan or of overseas territories of a state (police

1. In answering Question I-(a) ("Definition of the various factors -- military, economic, geographical, etc. -- upon which the power of a country in time of war depends") the Subcommittee made the broad general statement that there are "military, human, material, geographical, financial, and political elements on which depends the power of a nation to make war." It outlined the human factors as follows:

- a. Demographic elements
 - (1) Number
 - (2) Density and arrangement
 - (3) Homogeneity -- minority groups
 - (4) Nature of the population and its aptitude in making war
- b. Organization from the viewpoint of war
 - (1) Trained reserves
 - (2) Men to be trained (hommes a instruire)
 - (3) Specialists
 - (4) Labor force (male and female) in factories or establishments of any kind
 - (5) Personnel (male or female) in communications
 - (6) Labor force (male and female) in agriculture and fishing

force, gendarmerie, and military force proper to the extent that it contributes to the internal security of the said territory.)

"b. The effectives intended to assure external security depend on political and geographic conditions and on the risks of conflict.¹

"To obtain these effectives, the size of the population of a state permits it to employ different systems of military organization -- voluntary or conscription -- which act differently on the number of men prepared for the military service.

"A numerous population facilitates the recruitment of these effectives in permitting a choice and can lead the state not to give military instruction to all its male population. On the other hand, to obtain effectives corresponding to the needs of its security, a country with a relatively weak population finds itself obliged either to be less severe in the choice of its recruits or to incorporate all of its contingent or even to maintain several under its flag. Thus in principle the countries having a small number of inhabitants are obliged in order to assure their defense to call upon a larger proportion

1. Argentina, Belgium, Chile, Spain, Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Sweden and Czechoslovakia add to this sentence: "for example, when they are neighboring to countries the number of whose inhabitants is much larger than theirs."

of men than countries numerically strong.

Sub-commission B¹ added the following paragraphs:

"As regards factor 1 -- Population -- the Commission thinks it necessary to distinguish between absolute and relative numbers. It entirely approves the text adopted by Subcommittee A with regard to absolute numbers and desires to add the following observations with regard to relative numbers:

"The influence of relative numbers may be favorable...
[or] unfavorable.

"The density of the population exercises a favorable influence insofar as it permits a more rapid mobilization of men and industries and insofar as it is generally accompanied by a more highly developed economic organization and greater wealth.

"On the other hand, the density of the population, assuming an increasing degree of industrialization, generally calls for more abundant food supplies from abroad...

"When speaking of the density of the population, we must take into account the circumstances of its disposition. According as this disposition is more or less uniform and according as the greater density occurs at more or less vulnerable points, the influence of the density of the population may be radically

1. Sub-commission B was to deal with the political and economic

different.

"If any general conclusion can be drawn from the above questions, it will point to the practical impossibility of determining in a precise and scientific manner the influence of the different factors considered."

After the Sub-commissions had reported, both the French and British delegations to the Preparatory Commission submitted Draft conventions. In the Preamble to the French draft appeared a phrase that "reduction of armaments must be in accordance with general conditions of security and the special conditions of each state." In the course of the discussion during the next five days, it appeared that this provision was related to Question 5 (a) -- i.e., that "war potentialities" of a country such as geographical position, natural resources, and industrial power should be taken into consideration. However, by the time the Draft Convention reached its final form, no such provision or explanation appeared (not even in the numerous reservations made by the states on almost every article). No discussion of the Questionnaire, or of this particular point from it seems to have taken place at the Disarmament Conference itself.

APPENDIX C. PROVISION IN THE DRAFT CONVENTION FOR ADJUSTING
LENGTH OF MILITARY SERVICE TO COMPENSATE FOR DECLINE
IN THE BIRTH RATE

Chapter B of the Draft Convention ("Period of Service") reads in part as follows:

"Article 7.

"For each man the total period of service is the total number of days comprised in the different periods of service which he is liable under his national law to perform.

"Article 8.

"As an exception, each of the high contracting parties concerned may exceed the limits which he has accepted by the table annexed...so far as, owing to a falling-off in the number of births, such an increase may be necessary to enable the maximum total number of effectives fixed in his case...[elsewhere in the treaty].

"Article 9.

"In any case, the total period shall not exceed _____ months."

In the Commentary to the Draft Convention included in its report to the League Assembly (paragraph 82), the Preparatory Commission explained that Article 8 was prepared by the Belgian delegate "to obviate the disadvantage that would result in the case of certain countries which have the conscript system from a falling-off in the number of births as a consequence of

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the last war," and was agreed upon unanimously.

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APPENDIX D. AMERICAN PROPOSALS TO THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE
FOR REDUCING THE SIZE OF LAND ARMIES, AND DISCUSSION
ARISING OUT OF THE PROPOSAL

Point 7 of the memorandum by the Delegation of the United States to the Disarmament Conference (presented in February 1932) read as follows:

"The Delegation of the United States advocates the computation of the numbers of the armed forces on the basis of the effectives necessary for the maintenance of internal order plus some suitable contingent for defense. The former are obviously impossible of reduction; the latter is a question of relativity.

"Note. The only criterion for such a computation at present existing is to be found in the military forces maintained by the Central Powers in accordance with the treaties of peace which specify that they are to be exclusively employed in the maintenance of order and policing of frontiers. This would indicate that a study of the ratios of the number of effectives in these countries to the population and the territory would give some rough estimate of the number which world opinion has already agreed upon as essential for the purpose of order and indicate when applied to other nations that the remaining forces were destined at least for defense if not for possible aggression and in the categories for defense and attack, since ~~these numbers~~ must at present be based on comparisons with

similar forces of other states and are thus relative. Therefore stringent reduction may be justifiably sought in accordance with the purpose for which this conference was called."

The whole of the US Proposal, together with some twenty others, and the Draft Convention were coordinated into a Synoptic Table for discussion by the Conference. Point 7 was defined as a "question of principle" and was thereupon delivered up to the General Commission, where it became lost in a general flood of argument.

In June, however, President Hoover presented a special message to the Disarmament Conference with the suggestion that they act upon it. Among other proposals, this message reiterated Point 7 in somewhat more definite language, citing the size of the German army (100,000 men) in relation to the German population (65,000,000) and suggesting that this should be the basis for setting the defense contingent for the other nations, with allowances for the special needs of colonial powers. A general reduction of one-third was to be made in effectives above this determined level. Discussion centered around President Hoover's message from this time to the end of the conference session a month later. A few of the comments centered on Point 7.

The United Kingdom submitted a Commentary on President Hoover's Proposal which included the following paragraph:

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"The United States proposal for a division of land forces into a police component and a defense component will require very careful examination, but in so far as His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom understands the implication of the suggested basis of calculation, the result will be to show that the British land forces have already been reduced substantially below the number recognized to be necessary for the maintenance of internal order without making allowance for the forces needed for the lanes of communication between the United Kingdom and territories overseas."

The German, Austrian, and Hungarian delegates briefly endorsed the American proposals as a whole: their result would have been to bring general disarmament somewhat nearer the German level.

Litvinov applauded the Hoover Plan as a constructive suggestion, but in the course of the discussion pointed out that the USSR was opposed in principle to special provisions for colonial troop dispositions because of its stand against imperialism. Later, when it appeared that nothing was actually to be done about the proposals (which quickly became involved in a dispute about qualitative versus quantitative reduction) the USSR resumed its attack on "defense" needs as a basis of reduction, claiming this approach was futile (although it would be to Russia's own advantage, on the basis of population,

frontiers, distances, etc.), and reverting to its demand for "proportional percentage" reduction.

The French delegate disagreed with the proposals as a whole, seeing in it another attempt to dodge the French desire for security first. He questioned the method of reducing the number of effectives:

"As regards effectives, the methods of calculation adopted in the Hoover Plan whereby the military forces are split up into the home police component, the colonial police component, and the defense component seem to coincide with the French view that when peace is organized on sound lines no forces should be kept except for the internal needs of the home country, for colonial defense, and for international police action.

"But for the very reason that we openly agree with these views, we feel entitled to put before our American friends... the three following observations:

"(1) The calculation of effectives should be based not merely on the apparent strength but on the real strength, not merely on openly admitted organization but on secret organizations.

"(2) There would be very serious drawbacks to calculating the military forces in proportion to the population. To do so would put an unfair premium on quantity and encourage what I

may venture to call mass imperialism. The great nations would be allowed such large effectives that they would hold the small nations at their mercy...

"(3) President Hoover's proposal seems not to have contemplated the possibility of coalitions between these people, each of which has had its effectives limited. As a matter of fact, this danger already existed. In our view, however, the whole object of our work is to protect all nations by a system which, while obliging them to disarm, will guarantee their security."

Eventually the British swung to the French point of view; finally the discussion notted only the following innocuous resolution:

"The Conference...profoundly convinced that the time has come when all nations of the world must adopt substantial and comprehensive measures of disarmament...firmly determined to achieve a first decisive step involving a substantial reduction of armaments...welcoming heartily the initiative taken by the President of the United States of America...decides forthwith and unanimously...(1) that a substantial reduction of world armaments shall be effected to be applied by a general convention alike to land, naval, and air armaments; (2) that a primary objective shall be to reduce the means of attack."

The Conference, in its plan for the second session,

mentioned President Hoover's plan for limitation of effectives as still on the agenda. However, when the second session finally materialized in December 1933, it was just in time to see Hitler attain the chancellorship; the whole conference resolved itself into a struggle about German "equal rights" and never actually reached the level of specific proposals again before the German withdrawal caused its de facto, if not de jure termination.

APPENDIX E. ANSWERS TO SUB-COMMISSION A TO QUESTIONS I (a)
AND V (a) OF THE LEAGUE QUESTIONNAIRE

The most comprehensive statements on what constitutes war potential are to be found in the answers of Sub-commission A of the Preparatory Commission to the League Questionnaire submitted as a basis for discussion.

Question I (a) reads: "Definition of the various factors-- military, economic, geographic, etc. -- upon which the power of a country in time of war depends."

Subcommission A answered (in part):

"A complete list of the factors...in modern war would have to include all the factors of national life in time of peace.

"It is, however, necessary to determine the factors which are of main importance...These...are as follows:

1. The quantity, quality, and degree of preparedness... of the land, sea, and air forces...; the armament, equipment, and upkeep of those forces;
2. The number, composition, and distribution of its inhabitants, taking into account the...overseas territories;
3. The extent to which it is self-supporting...and the extent to which...it can obtain commodities... from abroad;

4. The geographical situation, the configuration of its territory and the development of its system of...communication;
5. Fixed defensive systems of the mother-country and colonies....;
6. The time which is at its disposal to...bring its forces into operation or to allow of outside help reaching the country...due to: either...natural protection...or its peace-time armaments...or the measures...adopted to expedite mobilization....;
7. The capacity of the country to produce or import war material in war time;
8. The external and internal political situation.

"Sub-commission A has enumerated in the following table the factors on which the strength of a country in war time depends....

"I. Military Factors...

"II. Human Factors...¹

"III. Material Factors...

1. Material and animals in use in the land, sea or air forces in peace time;
2. Stores of mobilization munitions and material;
3. Animals, vehicles, merchantmen, civil and commercial aircraft for requisition;

1. ~~These sections~~ have been treated separately in detail in Part Two above.

4. Stocks of raw material and fuel, clothing, food-stuffs and finished and semi-finished products...;
5. Industrial strength, including:
 - (a) Industrial plant;
 - (b) Means of transport and communication of all kinds...;
 - (c) Wealth of the soil and subsoil;
6. Agricultural resources;
7. Fishing gear;
8. Livestock.

"IV. Geographical Factors

1. Situation of the country in relation to other countries and...to the possibility and effectiveness of a blockade...;
2. Area;
3. Relief and nature of the land...;
4. Land and sea frontiers; their depth and nature; depth of sea;
5. Relation between the area of the country and the length of its frontiers;
6. Position of vital centers and land communications in relation to the frontiers and air and naval bases of the neighboring countries;

7. Length of the lines of maritime or river communication between the country and its sources of supply and their vulnerability...;
8. Continuous or separated territories...

"V. Financial Factors

1. Foreign credit;
2. Gold reserve;
3. Credits to be obtained on the strength of a surplus of exportable resources, surplus of means of transport, etc.;
4. Private wealth.

"VI. Political Factors

[These factors are beyond the competence of Sub-commission A's assignment; however it calls attention to] the existence of revolutionary elements within a country or revolutionary conditions throughout the country...

Question V (a) reads: "On what principle will it be possible to draw up a scale of armaments permissible to the various countries, taking into account particularly: population; resources; geographical situation; length and nature of maritime communications; density and character of railways; vulnerability of the frontiers and of the important vital centers near the frontiers; the time required...to transform peace armaments into war armaments?"

Sub-commission A, instead of answering the question

which called for an enunciation of a principle, merely listed once again the various factors mentioned in the question; giving observations and comments on the nature of the factors covered.

"I. Influence of the Number of Inhabitants...¹

"II. Influence of Resources

Adequate economic resources facilitate the building up of peace-time armaments, and may allow of a protracted war being waged by reducing to a minimum the consequences of a blockade.

On the other hand, inadequate resources compel a country:

- (a) To create in advance...stocks of material required for its...defense;
- (b) To maintain permanently the forces required to ensure...the uninterrupted protection of...communication....

"III. Influence of the Geographical Situation

[The enumeration of Question I (a) is repeated in almost the same words.]

"IV. Influence of the Nature and Length of Maritime Communications

[This influence] appears in one of the following forms:

1. See Appendix B, p. 106.

- (a) Naval forces adequate to the task of protecting...the maritime communications of countries [who] depend on supplies...from overseas...
- (b) Or naval forces commensurate with the total extent of maritime communications...between...territories...under the sovereignty, protectorate or mandate of...the country and the non-contiguous parts of the same territory...
- (c) Or, failing adequate naval forces, the accumulation of stocks...
- (d) Or, failing adequate naval forces, the permanent maintenance, in each of the territories liable to be isolated...of the military forces and supplies necessary to insure their defense independently of reinforcement.

"V. Influence of the Density and Character of Railways
...separate attention should be given to:

- (a) The railways in the particular country;
- (b) The railways in the neighboring countries.

The density, grouping, carrying capacity, technical nature and general lie of the railways effect the possibility of concentration and strategical manoeuvres. They may [thus determine] number of peace effectives...

A dense network of railways...may in certain cases

readily lend itself to operations of aggression...

The armaments required by a country may, from this point of view in particular, be influenced by the threat resulting from the density and military value of the railways of a neighboring country...

"VI. Influence of the Vulnerability of the Frontiers and of the Important Vital Centers near the Frontiers

The vulnerability of the frontiers resulting directly from their length as well as their nature...as also the number and proximity of important vital centers to these frontiers, may necessitate:

- (a) The organization of the...defense of these... frontiers...
- (b) The permanent maintenance of land, sea and air covering forces sufficient to protect national mobilization
- (c) The rapid mobilization of naval, air, and land forces required to meet any attack and repel any invasion...and consequently the need of these forces being prepared and trained beforehand.

"VII. Influence of the Time Required, Which Will be Different for Different Countries, to Convert Peace Armaments into War Armaments

As a result of this influence, the extent of peace armaments and covering forces will depend on the time required to

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bring the national resources into operation."

The answers to questions I (a) and V (a) were submitted substantially unanimously by all members of the sub-commission.

(League of Nations, Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, Report of Sub-commission A.)

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APPENDIX F. THE FRENCH POSITION

"There is no doubt that at one time the French had in mind the idea of establishing a numerical coefficient for the armaments of each Power. So many marks were to be given under each heading [Population, resources, geography, colonies, density of railways, length of maritime communications, vulnerability of frontiers] and the higher the total, the less the armaments, and vice versa. Temporley, Maj. Gen. A.C., op.cit.

In the declaration trained reserves, which gave reasons for refusing to limit the French illuminated this general position:

"It may be affirmed that the limitation...would have the effect in case of conflict of giving the certainty of victory to the state with the greatest war potential...On the other hand, as between two States, one of which has a superiority in trained reserves and the other a superiority in war potential...resort to war is unlikely." (League of Nations, Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, Report of Sub-commission A.)

At another time, the French asserted their need for an army large enough to let her "attain a superiority in...time which will discourage any aggressive tendency [of a state with a larger war potential]..." (League of Nations, Report of the Temporary Mixed Commission on Disarmament, 1922.)

APPENDIX G. THE HUNGARIAN MEMORANDUM

During the Disarmament Conference itself, Hungary naturally voted against France, since the situation had developed, for the defeated powers, into a struggle towards "equality of rights" overshadowing all other considerations. But in 1925 Hungary submitted to the Preparatory Commission (of which it was not a member) a rather interesting memorandum which actually foreshadowed the French position. (League of Nations, Annex II to the Report of the Temporary Mixed Commission on Armaments, 1922.)

The memorandum pointed out that a country's power depends upon its population, its resources, and its geographical unity. These determine the characteristics of its armaments. However, these basic factors may not, generally speaking, be restricted without involving the "mutilation of the country." But the peace-time armaments, which are the "tangible factor upon which depends the employment of the country in time of war" are capable of limitation; they should be limited, therefore, in accordance with the background "subjective" factors:

The Hungarian Government proposed that each country should be the subject of special investigations on the basis of which its scale of armaments should be set. Only after this scale was determined would it be possible to state whether a

country's armaments were out of line. Then, when reduction took place, it should cover peace-time army and equipment, trained reserves and stocks, and factories especially engaged in war production. And the aim of limitation should be an army unable to commit aggression. At some points the wording of the memorandum led to confusion as to whether armaments should be limited in direct or in inverse ratio to war potential; seemingly the problem was solved simply by proposing the individual investigation of every country. However, the general position of the memorandum is unmistakably related to the French desire to balance the size of the peace-time army against the ultimate war strength. This indicates that, in the absence of pre-determined political necessity, the line of division on the proper treatment of war potential would have been very simple indeed with the United States, Great Britain, and possibly Germany alone in their opposition to the self-adjudged "have-not" nations.

APPENDIX H. NON-QUANTITATIVE FACTORS IN WAR POTENTIAL

"The Dutch produced the famous "fogs and bogs" memorandum, when they claimed more armaments because their climate and subsoil were both unfavorable. The Rumanians considered that national courage and military spirit, or lack of it, should be assessed in the "war potential"...None could deny that there was logically something in the French thesis, but it would always have been impossible to get any practical results from it." (Temperley, op. cit.)

At one time as a part of Question V (a) the Preparatory Commission referred to a Joint Economic Commission formed from the League Secretariat the problem of expressing in quantitative terms (or at least in terms comparable for different states) the various factors which might be grouped as "war potential." The Joint Commission obligingly christened the "total effect of the factors" coefficient B. Then it went on to say that B is a quantity that must be determined empirically by the Disarmament Conference, that it is "not the same for each state in relation to every other state," that the factors acting upon B considered separately may give very different results from the factors considered in combination, and that armament itself may change the direction of the effect of a factor in B. They declined to draw up a list of all the raw materials, products, and industries which should be included

in determining B, saying that such a list would be all-inclusive. They did, however, indicate that published quantitative data were available concerning the population, most material resources, the length and nature of maritime communications, and the density and character of railways, of practically every country in the world. (League of Nations, Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, Report No. I of Sub-commission B.)

At a much earlier stage, before the Preparatory Commission was instituted, the Second Assembly of the League of Nations circulated a questionnaire among its members asking that each government should "furnish a statement of the considerations it may wish to urge in respect to the requirements of its national security, its international obligations, its geographical situation, and its special conditions [with regard to disarmament]". Answers to this question give an index of the number of factors which would be claimed in an open field as influencing war potential:

South Africa claimed that her negro population necessitated a large army.

Belgium pointed to her geographical position, laying her open to invasion.

Bulgarian needed her army increased because of the danger of a communist uprising.

Czechoslovakia indicated that her long frontiers, the position of vital centers near the frontiers, and its poorly integrated railways (especially when compared to its neighbor's excellent ones), were all factors which weakened its war potential;

France in reply pointed out the danger of Germany's larger population, stronger industries, and dynamic economy;

Britain indicated its colonial needs as calling for strong navy and adequate colonial troops;

Italy had large centers located near frontiers which must be protected;

Poland submitted a treatise: she was in an extremely difficult geographic situation; her coal supplies and industries were located near the frontiers; her communications were badly integrated and inadequate; the ratios between length of frontiers and area, and between length of frontiers and density of population were to her disadvantage when compared with her neighbors; she was without trained reserves and military factories.

Etc. (League of Nations, Report of the Temporary Mixed Commission on Disarmament, 1922.)

APPENDIX I. ANSWERS OF SUB-COMMISSION A TO QUESTION I OF
THE LEAGUE QUESTIONNAIRE

Question I of the Questionnaire reads: "What is to be understood by the expression 'armaments'?"

The answer of the British Empire, Bulgaria, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United States is:

"By the general expression 'armaments' must be understood:

1. The forces in service in peace time (permanently organized armed forces and material and establishments which they use);
2. The forces prepared for war times (reserves of trained personnel, stocks of materials and preparations of every description undertaken with a view to war);
3. The ultimate war forces created during hostilities by means of the general resources at the disposal of each country, these resources not being in themselves armaments properly so called."

The answer of Argentina, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, Italy, Japan, Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia is:

"A distinction must be drawn between

Peace-time and

War-time armaments.

1. Peace-time armaments must be understood to mean the forces in service in peace time (land, naval, and air forces organized on a permanent footing and capable of use without preliminary mobilization measures, together with their material, livestock and establishments.)
2. War-time armaments must be understood to mean the forces capable of use in time of war, namely:
 - (a) Trained reserves...[who] should be regarded as including men who have received specialized technical training...
 - (b) Mobilization material (stocks of material and material that can be requisitioned...)
 - (c) All other personnel and material that can be brought into action in the course of hostilities by means of the general resources at the disposal of each country.

In their Declarations (to be included in the Report of Sub-commission A), the United States and France, as spokesmen, were most interested in rebuttals of the opposing definition.

The Declaration of the United States objects to the other definition because "the extraordinary contention is made that resources and armaments are synonymous." The point is made

that the time involved in mobilizing for modern war makes resources fairly useless for a long period after the beginning of hostilities; the experience of the United States in World War I was cited as an example.

The French Declaration reads, in part: "From a technical point of view, the conduct of modern war demands a combination of all the means of action at a country's disposal. A definition of armaments would therefore be obsolete and incomplete if it did not fully take into account the general resources at the disposal of each country, even if these resources in themselves were not armaments properly so called..."

It is not possible to draw any distinction between so-called military factors and civil factors capable of assisting in the constitution of armaments..." (League of Nations Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, Report of Sub-commission A.)

APPENDIX J. ANSWERS OF SUB-COMMISSION A TO QUESTION I (b)
OF THE LEAGUE QUESTIONNAIRE

Question I (b) reads: "Definition and special character of the various factors which constitute the armaments of a country in time of peace..."

The French group framed the following summary:

"Peace-time armaments comprise:

1. Peace-time effectives
 - (a) Military...
 - (b) Organized on a military basis.../I.e., gendarmerie, special police, foresters, etc.7
2. Material and animals in service of the army, navy, and air forces whose effectives are enumerated above...
3. Fixed defensive systems in the mother-country and colonies, naval bases, defended ports, and any adaptation of the geographical features of the country with a view to war.
4. Arsenals, explosive factories, and other peace-time military establishments, and any adaptation of the industry of a country with a view to war capable of being used without measures of mobilization."

The United States, the British Empire, Chile, Netherlands,

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and Argentina wished the underlined portion of paragraph 4 to be omitted. Their declaration pointed out that "there is little in industry which cannot be turned almost immediately to purposes quite foreign to the ordinary peace-time objects of the industry and that, as a practical matter, it would be extremely difficult to determine what industries of a country are capable of being used for war purposes without measures of mobilization..."

The same countries, with the exception of Argentina, and with the addition of Finland and Sweden, made the addition of trained reserves and stocks of material as a part of peace-time armaments.

The United States wished to delete the underlined portion of paragraph 3.

(League of Nations Preparatory Commission of the Disarmament Conference, Report of Sub-commission A.)

APPENDIX K. ANSWER OF SUB-COMMISSION A TO QUESTION II (a)
OF THE LEAGUE QUESTIONNAIRE

Question II (a) reads: "Is it practicable to limit the ultimate war strength of a country or must any measures of disarmament be confined to the peace strength?"

Sub-commission A submitted the following answer unanimously:

"[The Commission] is of the opinion that it would not be practicable to limit the ultimate war strength of a country... It is possible to limit...forces permanently maintained in peacetime or capable of immediate use without preliminary mobilization measures. This principle is in any case without prejudice to the conditions of such limitation...

"Theoretically, limitations may be looked for in the following directions:

1. Land, sea, and air effectives constantly available
 2. Length of voluntary or compulsory service
 3. Land, naval, and air material in use and in reserve
 4. Expenditure on training and the cost of materials for armaments as a whole
 5. Chemical preparation
 6. Aeronautical preparation
 7. Preparations for utilizing the mercantile marine
 8. Industrial preparations in general
- } .
} undertaken
} with a
} view to war"

Practical difficulties were discussed as parts of the answers to other questions; besides the trained-reserves and stock-piles hurdle, the question of a supervisory agency and of budgetary limitation were recurrent.⁷

(League of Nations, Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, Report of Sub-commission A.)

APPENDIX L. ANSWER OF SUB-COMMISSION A TO QUESTION II OF
THE LEAGUE QUESTIONNAIRE

Question II reads: "By what standards is it possible to measure the armaments of one country against the armaments of another...?"

The report of Sub-commission A before going into details about the particular problems involved (e.g., comparing conscript to voluntary armies, comparing total tonnage to tonnage by class, etc.) made the following generalization:

Legitimately, only the armaments which may be compared are those of countries between which it might be possible in wartime to establish a sort of equilibrium as regards their situation and resources in case of attack. If other are compared, the following considerations should not be overlooked:

- (a) Comparisons are approximate, even if not completely false;
- (b) "Comparisons...could only be corrected by estimating the differences in resources and position in figures and by taking these differences into account. In most cases, however, these difficulties lie precisely in factors which cannot be expressed in figures. We can, then, only take these elements into account in the form of indispensable commentaries."

(League of Nations, Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, Report of Sub-commission A.)

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